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Bringing the Spies in from the Cold:
Legal Cosmopolitanism and Intelligence
Under the Laws of War
By PEYTON COOKE*
Of course it’s a violation of international law, that’s why it’s a covert
action.
—Former Vice President Al Gore1
Introduction
FOR THIRTY YEARS, U.S. intelligence agencies have been fight-
ing—and losing—a battle for legal autonomy. Until recently, this bat-
tle was waged under the domestic constraints that emerged in the
mid-to-late 1970s and 1980s.2 These reforms centered around reduc-
ing “rogue” intelligence activities and putting intelligence firmly
under domestic, specifically congressional, oversight.3 Congressional
concern then centered on how the activities of intelligence agencies
affect people within the United States and U.S. citizens abroad.
This has begun to change, however. Recent upheavals in intelli-
gence law are characterized by an increased concern for foreign na-
tionals located outside the United States who have been affected by
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1. RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR 144
(2004).
2. See INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755
(1976); see also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”), 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801–1811 (1982).
3. For example, during the Iran-Contra affair, the United States sent aid to dissi-
dents in Nicaragua in violation of both international law and a congressional injunction,
but the hearings hardly mentioned international law. Subsequent reforms attempted to
make it more difficult for executive agencies to violate Congress’s will. See IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR, H.R. REP. NO. 100-433, S. REP. NO. 100-216 (1988).
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U.S. intelligence activities, as well as a desire to shift oversight from
the political branches to the courts. This trend, “legal cosmopolitan-
ism,” has resulted in an increased application of international law to
intelligence activities, and such application will almost certainly in-
crease in the next few years. This Article seeks to address these
changes. Part I defines and examines legal cosmopolitanism: the the-
ory that legal actors in the United States, uncomfortable with the
largely unregulated nature of intelligence activity, have increasingly
agitated to bring more intelligence operations under an established
legal framework. They have done so by arguing the conception of the
U.S. demos should, first, be expanded to include foreign citizens af-
fected by U.S. actions, and second, offer public and legal protections
for these foreign citizens.
Part II surveys how intelligence has traditionally been regulated
under domestic and international law. Until recently, intelligence reg-
ulation was premised on a traditional conception of the U.S. demos,
i.e., citizens within the United States received the most protection, cit-
izens abroad significantly less, and non-citizens abroad none at all.
Furthermore, international law does not exist beyond those laws that
prohibit or discourage the activities of “spies and saboteurs.”4
Part III analyzes the content of these protections and, in particu-
lar, how they relate to the law of war. It argues that because there is a
great demand for the international regulation of intelligence, U.S. le-
gal actors have had to look outside the insufficient intelligence law
framework towards the highly restrictive law of war framework.
Finally, Part IV concludes by addressing the two reasons why this
spread of the law of war to intelligence operations may be normatively
desirable. First, even though military and intelligence operations
often share goals and can share methods, International Humanitarian
Law (“IHL”) deliberately does not include intelligence operations
within its scope,5 so these rules may not be sensitive to the differences
between military and intelligence operations. Second, intelligence op-
erations are often illegal and necessarily secret by design. If intelli-
4. See, e.g., IV INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, GENEVA CONVENTION: RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 52 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Major Ronald
Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton, trans., 1958) (“As soon as the subject came up for discussion at
the Diplomatic Conference several delegations explained that in their opinion provision
would have to be made for certain exceptions [to the protections afforded under the Ge-
neva Conventions] in the case of spies and saboteurs.”) [hereinafter ICRC, PROTECTION OF
CIVILIAN PERSONS].
5. See infra Part II.B (discussing how the law of war penalizes intelligence activity
while formally permitting it, thus leaving no legal space to develop true regulations).
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gence operations can be brought as thoroughly within existing law as
diplomatic or military operations, then there is no reason to maintain
separate intelligence services.
I. Legal Cosmopolitanism: In Theory and In Practice
Legal cosmopolitanism is represented not only in Boumediene v.
Bush (“Boumediene”),6 which extended habeas corpus rights to Guanta´-
namo detainees,7 but also in a number of international decisions that
both illuminate and reinforce Boumediene’s logic. Moreover, it has re-
ceived more robust, but less effective, expression in the work of the
activists who drive so much of the Global War on Terror (“GWOT”)
litigation. This Part briefly defines legal cosmopolitanism as a concept,
and then expands on that definition by examining materials from
both international cases and litigants in the United States.
A. Defining Legal Cosmopolitanism
Legal cosmopolitanism, as used here, means expanding the de-
mos of a state to include nonresident aliens affected by the state’s
actions and securing these gains by replacing executive power with
judicial power. Although this term closely relates to Eric Posner’s con-
cept of judicial cosmopolitanism,8 Posner’s view is more limited. In
Posner’s reading, Boumediene turned on a profound change in judicial
attitude—notably “the [normative] view that judges have a constitu-
tional obligation to protect the interests of noncitizens.”9 In Posner’s
conception, judicial cosmopolitanism is about both how judges see
themselves and how they see the demos. Judges exist to fix “demo-
cratic failures,” i.e., to correct the antidemocratic excesses of demo-
cratic systems.10 One of these notable failures is that the law does not
take into account how U.S. actions affect those overseas.11 Thus, it
6. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
7. Id. at 2261.
8. Eric Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism, CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 23 (2008) [hereinafter Posner, Judicial Cosmopolitanism].
9. Id. at 24–25.
10. Id. at 35.
11. Id. at 38 (“A global welfarist argument for extraterritorial constitutionalism is that
the political branches have no, or very weak, incentives to take account of the well-being of
noncitizens because noncitizens don’t vote. Democratic failure arises because the demos
consists of the global population but only a small fraction of it—American citizens—can
vote for American government officials who affect the greater demos. Americans have
strong incentives to compel their leaders to adopt policies that effect transfers from the
rest of the world to the United States.”).
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falls to judges, in their protective role, to correct this failure by “ex-
tending” the Constitution.
Posner’s concept, however, fails to address relevant legal actions
outside the courts and has little to say about how or why judges apply
non-constitutional legal standards—even though both of these are
critical to understanding how judicial decisions and executive action
have played out both in the United States and overseas. Legal cosmo-
politanism differs from judicial cosmopolitanism because it posits a
more widespread feeling on the desirability of expanding the demos
and a more generalized preference—beyond the constitutional—for
legal standards over political ones.
The starting point behind legal cosmopolitanism is that govern-
ments in the past only concerned themselves with a limited number of
people. The term often given to these people-of-concern is the demos,
meaning, literally, the “people” of a certain state.12 When used in its
derivative “democracy,” it implies an expanded area of concern—that
not only does the state concern itself with the aristocracy, or other
powerful sub-groups, but also with the common people.13
But when used to define in-groups and out-groups, demos tends
to limit, rather than expand, the persons with whom the state con-
cerns itself. Under the traditional definition, a state will only concern
itself with its own residents. Thus, when a state acts internationally, it
will not concern itself with the citizens of another state. Indeed, Rob-
ert Dahl has described inclusion in the demos, historically speaking,
as reflecting the prejudices of its time—including xenophobia.14 At its
most expansive, demos might include all residents of a nation-state,
but not anyone across its borders.15 In its most limited conception,
demos would exclude not only women and many minorities, but also
12. Rainer Baubock, Political Community Beyond the Sovereign State, Supranational Federal-
ism, and Transnational Minorities, in CONCEIVING COSMOPOLITANISM: THEORY, CONTEXT, AND
PRACTICE 113–14 (Steven Vertovec & Robin Cohen eds., 2002) (“Democratic cosmopolitan-
ism must also ask what kind of demos these institutions will represent and be accountable
to. One strategy might be to adopt a purely formal conception of the demos as the aggre-
gate of persons who happen to be subject to a given political authority . . . [whereas] [t]he
alternative view is that the demos not only conceptually precede the institutions that re-
present it, but must also correspond to a social reality: a significant status of membership, a
widespread sense of belonging and a historical trajectory of community.”).
13. 8 GEORGE F. MCLEAN & PATRICK J. ASPELL, ANCIENT WESTERN PHILOSOPHY: THE
HELLENIC EMERGENCE 158 (1997) (describing government by the demos, in the ancient
Greek understanding, as “government by the lower class,” and related to but not the same
as democracy).
14. ROBERT ALAN DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 120–24 (Yale Univ. Press 1991).
15. Id. at 320–21.
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foreign citizens resident in the state.16 Therefore, only resident-citi-
zens would be included.
The first premise of legal cosmopolitanism is that the demos
needs to expand to include the interests of foreign citizens, including
those not in the home country’s territory. Dahl suggests, factually, the
demos of democratic states are becoming transnational,17 and there-
fore, the demos of a state ought to include all persons affected by that
state’s actions.18 The second premise posits the state should limit the
power and discretion of the Executive, while increasing the power of
the judiciary. Such a position finds its justification in deliberative dem-
ocratic theory, which emphasizes that democracy requires both the
absence of coercion in political life and the inclusion of all affected
parties. Therefore, legal cosmopolitanism strives to correct how the
state organizes itself and distributes power. The courts play a vital role
by providing a remedy against the coercion of minority groups, and by
offering an avenue by which small groups might include themselves in
the democratic process by getting their “fair say.”19
B. Legal Cosmopolitanism in Practice: In the Courts and Among
the Litigants
Legal cosmopolitanism is not simply a philosophical position. It
reflects many real-world actions by courts, litigants, and activists when
challenging the government over intelligence activities. Practically, it
increases the scope of judicial inquiry by expanding jurisdiction extra-
territorially and into national security matters; and, in a closely related
development, replaces to some extent executive authority with judicial
authority. These developments serve to expand the demos by, first,
expanding the categories of people who can seek redress against a
government to traditionally excluded groups like nonresidents; and,
second, by expanding the classes of cases heard in the courts in a way
that will generally benefit nonresidents. For that reason, since na-
tional security and military action—as opposed to criminal action—is
typically against foreign persons,20 the expansion of judicial inquiry
16. Id.
17. Id. at 318–19.
18. Id. at 122–24.
19. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 101–02
(Harv. Univ. Press 2002).
20. See, e.g., Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006) (“Whoever, except in cases
and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, will-
fully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to exe-
cute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or
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and remedy into these matters will disproportionately benefit
nonresidents.
1. Legal Cosmopolitanism in Foreign and International Courts
International courts have been among the most aggressive in reg-
ulating national security activity. In particular, non-U.S. courts en-
gaged with GWOT issues (or their foreign equivalents) have discarded
jurisdiction based on territory and nationality in favor of notions of
practical control. As a result of these jurisdictional extensions, courts
have increasingly expanded the judicial role, at the expense of the
executive role, in national security.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“Inter-Amer-
ican Commission”) has explicitly ruled that any individual person
under the effective control of a state may exercise jurisdiction against
that state, regardless of other circumstances such as armed conflict or
physical presence in another sovereign’s territory.21 This conception
of jurisdiction—tied to the individual, not to territory, with a com-
plete disregard of formal control—seems the closest to the cosmopoli-
tan notion that any person affected by a state’s actions belongs in that
state’s demos.
More commonly, however, courts rule that to be subject to juris-
diction, the accused state, in addition to control over the individual,
must also have control of the territory where the individual is located.
Yet, like the Inter-American Commission, these tribunals have disre-
garded formal notions of sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction and,
as a result, have aggressively reshaped national security policy in favor
of the courts. The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) has
used a doctrine of effective control to establish jurisdiction over de-
tainees, even those captured abroad or as part of ongoing military op-
erations. Specifically, in Ocalan v. Turkey (“Ocalan”)22 and Ramirez-
Sanchez v. France (“Ramirez-Sanchez”),23 the ECHR ruled the jurisdic-
both.”); see also Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703, 7728 (Feb. 18, 1976), at 5(b)
(addressing restrictions on collecting intelligence against U.S. citizens).
21. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 37 (1999), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/
99eng/Merits/UnitedStates10.951.htm (where plaintiff was in the custody of Grenadian
officials, but successfully brought suit against the United States on the theory that the
United States, during its military operation in Grenada, unduly influenced the authorities
there).
22. O¨calan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, May 12, 2005, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005–IV) (con-
vention applies to Turkish terrorism suspect detained by Turkey in Kenya).
23. Ramirez-Sanchez v. France, no. 28780/95, Comm’n Decision of June 24, 1996, DR
155.
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tion of the European Convention on Human Rights extended to, in
the former case, a terrorist leader captured during military opera-
tions; and, in the latter, to the famed terrorist Carlos the Jackal, a
Venezuelan national whom the French security services had captured
in Africa.24 As to expanding judicial power, the ECHR has taken it
upon itself to outlaw cruel, inhuman, or degrading (“CID”) treatment
in the midst of an armed conflict25 and to ban extraordinary rendition
despite ongoing anti-terror operations.26 The British Law Lords have
taken the logic of practical control leading to jurisdiction to its con-
clusion, ruling that Iraqis injured by British forces within the city of
(British-occupied) Basra did not have recourse against the British gov-
ernment, but an Iraqi inside a British-run prison in Basra did.27
By regulating such activities, specifically anti-terrorism activities,
courts are necessarily replacing executive power with judicial power,
while also increasing a state’s demos. The tripartite system of govern-
ment in the United States, with its unusually strong judiciary, involves
a separation of powers concern that is more explicit than in interna-
tional cases. In addition, whereas non-U.S. courts have regulated na-
tional security matters under human rights law, U.S. courts have
applied a highly restrictive version of the law of war. Nevertheless, the
international and foreign courts’ preference for functional jurisdic-
tion and expansion of the judicial role closely parallels developments
in their U.S. counterparts.28
2. Legal Cosmopolitanism Among U.S. Litigants
One of the prime examples of legal cosmopolitanism—and the
example of Posner’s judicial cosmopolitanism29—is the Guanta´namo
detainee litigation.30 The Center for Constitutional Rights (“CCR”)31
24. Id.
25. Ireland v. United Kingdom, judgment of Jan. 18, 1978, Ser. A no. 25 (declaring
illegal certain interrogation techniques the United Kingdom had employed against Irish
citizens during the conflict in Northern Ireland).
26. Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, Feb. 28, 2008, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008 (concerning
deportation of terrorist to Tunisia).
27. Al-Skeini v. Sec’y of State for Defence [2007] A.C. 153, available at http://www.
bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2004/2911.html.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See Posner, Judicial Cosmopolitanism, supra note 8, at 24 (Posner theorizes that
Boumediene’s holding “turns on an implicit theory about the rights of noncitizens, a theory
that is prior to the conception of separation of powers and is essentially about who belongs
to the political community or demos. Justice Kennedy’s theory is a cosmopolitan theory.”)
30. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006);
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). There are, of course, other GWOT cases—
including others with which the Center for Constitutional Rights has been involved—such
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has been involved in almost every significant aspect of Guanta´namo
litigation, including landmark decisions like Rasul v. Bush (“Rasul”),32
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (“Hamdan”),33 and Boumediene—the three pillars
of current GWOT jurisprudence—and boasts of having “filed the first
case on behalf of detainees at Guanta´namo” more than five years
ago.34
The present concern, however, is how CCR might typify a legal
cosmopolitan agenda in both a concern for people beyond the tradi-
tional demos and a desire to protect those people under the law.
CCR’s brief in Boumediene stops short of arguing the Constitution ap-
plies in full at Guanta´namo.35 It does, however, provide a broad claim
of constitutional habeas rights and an expansive reading of Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld (“Hamdi”)36 that would extend full due process rights to the
Guanta´namo detainees.37 It argues that not only does habeas apply in
light of recent GWOT decisions, but also that habeas applies at Guan-
ta´namo as a matter of original understanding.
Although the petitioners argued, based on Hamdi, the govern-
ment violated the due process rights of Guanta´namo detainees, they
never identified that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen held on U.S. soil, while
the Guanta´namo detainees were neither U.S. citizens nor held on U.S.
soil. This is a puzzling omission unless coupled with the unstated pre-
mise that the Constitution, at least the due process clause, applies in
Guanta´namo the same as it does in the continental United States.
as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), and Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 436 (2004).
These, however, concern detainees held domestically who are not subject to international
law in any strong sense, especially after Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), and its pre-
sumption that non-self-executing treaties are not judicially, nor domestically, enforceable
without implementing legislation.
31. CCR began its work representing rights activists in 1966. Center for Constitutional
Rights, Mission and History, http://ccrjustice.org/missionhistory (last visited Apr. 4,
2010). It currently works on behalf of a broader human rights agenda using “the law as a
positive force for social change” and representing Guanta´namo Bay detainees as one of its
main projects. Id.
32. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
33. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
34. CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, GUANTA´NAMO AND ILLEGAL DETENTIONS 3,
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_GTMO.pdf.
35. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (No.
06-1195), 2007 WL 2441590.
36. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
37. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 35, at 44–50.
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II. Situating Intelligence Under the Law
The defining feature of foreign intelligence might be its—some-
times assumed, sometimes real—lack of legal control.38 Domestically,
this reputation arises from three sources. First, until the 1970s, intelli-
gence agencies labored under few legal controls. Second, since the
1970s, the Executive Branch has expended considerable effort to
avoid legal restrictions. For example, the second Bush Administration
argued that even restrictions on domestic intelligence gathering were
unconstitutional.39 Third, much regulation of intelligence, and many
intelligence cases, are themselves secret in whole or in part.40 Such
secrecy—though eminently defensible—creates, in conjunction with
the first two factors, an impression of lack of oversight, and hence a
lack of legal control.
Furthermore, very little international law addresses intelligence.
Indeed, beyond bilateral and multilateral intelligence-sharing treaties,
which do not address intelligence methods,41 no in-depth treatment
of intelligence exists in international law. While some bodies of inter-
national law, such as the law of war or human rights law, can poten-
tially provide for very substantial intelligence oversight, the
international law of intelligence itself does not. Intelligence-as-intelli-
gence occupies a very murky place in international law that might be
characterized as either legal but discouraged,42 or illegal but not en-
38. Recall the quote that began this Article: “Of course it’s a violation of international
law, that’s why it’s a covert action.” CLARKE, supra note 1, at 144 (quoting then Vice Presi-
dent Al Gore).
39. See, e.g., Barton Gellman, Conflict over Spying Led White House to Brink, WASH. POST,
Sept. 14, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2008/09/13/AR2008091302284.html.
40. See, e.g., In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review, Aug. 22, 2008) (In this case—the only appellate opinion of the appeals court
charged with overseeing the FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2006)—both the full title and
a large portion of the text have been redacted for security reasons).
41. The Lombok Treaty between Australia and Indonesia is purportedly unique in the
level of cooperation and intelligence sharing envisions, but still only generally speaks to its
directives and only requires treaty signatories to pledge not to undermine each other but
without specifiying any methods or means. See, e.g., Agreement Between Australia and The
Republic of Indonesia on the Framework for Security Cooperation, Austl.-Indon. Nov. 13,
2006, 2008 Austl. T.S. No. 3, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/GEO/indonesia/ind-aus-
sec06.html.
42. See id. (This agreement only addresses “Intelligence Cooperation” briefly in Arti-
cle 3(12) and does not discuss intelligence methods.).
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forced.43 To the extent international intelligence law exists, it does
not provide an effective mechanism for intelligence regulation.
These laws—or the lack thereof—form the background against
which to view legal cosmopolitanism. Intelligence and legal cosmopol-
itanism proceed from completely different conceptions of the demos.
Intelligence law has self-consciously limited what protections it offers
based on what seems a highly traditional conception of the demos.
A. Intelligence in U.S. Law: Limiting the Demos on a Sliding Scale
1. (Relatively) Extensive Domestic Legislation
Up until the 1970s, very little domestic law applied to intelligence
activities. It was believed that intelligence activities were the sort of
dark, necessary activities justified by the “higher purpose” of national
survival.44 Even today, as Kenneth Anderson has noted, a great deal of
the debate turns on threat assessment.45 Proponents of, for example,
the CIA’s program of secret detention have characterized the threats
to the United States as existential, justifying an unrestrained, supra-
legal response.46
Legally, this argument belongs to the past. The National Security
Act of 1947 has regulated the CIA since its inception.47 The fact that
foreign intelligence is regulated has not changed; rather, the changes
have come from the ending of almost-exclusive executive regulatory
43. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. I, 862 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed.
1955) (noting the permissibility, in international law, of peacetime intelligence gathering);
see also INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1997 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 564 (Yves
Sandoz et al, eds. 1987) (stating that espionage during armed conflict is not prohibited,
but is discouraged via the punishment of individual spies) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY
ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS].
44. Frederic F. Manget, Intelligence and the Rise of Judicial Intervention, CIA.GOV, Apr. 14,
2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/96unclass/manget.htm (tracing the increased oversight roles that Con-
gress and the courts have played in regulating intelligence since the 1970s).
45. Kenneth Anderson, The Assumptions Behind the Assumptions in the War on Terror: Risk
Assessment as an Example of Foundational Disagreement in Counterterrorism Policy, 54 WAYNE L.
REV. 505, 507 (2008).
46. RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE 62 (2006) (quoting then Vice Presi-
dent Dick Cheney saying, “If there’s a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are
helping al-Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in
terms of our response. . . . It’s not about our analysis, or finding a preponderance of
evidence. . . . It’s about our response.”); Jane Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation: Can the C.I.A.
Legally Kill a Prisoner?, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 14, 2005, at 44 (giving an account of how
some in the U.S. government believed it necessary to use “any means at [their] disposal” to
counter the al-Qaeda threat).
47. 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4)(B) (2006).
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authority and the shifting of some regulatory power to Congress and
the courts. These changes, however, neither addressed nor employed
international law in any capacity. Indeed, the overwhelming purpose
of these laws seems to have been the protection of U.S. citizens and
other people on U.S. soil. When judges did apply legal standards to
the CIA and other agencies, the standards came entirely from the do-
mestic sphere.
Some of the most important of these domestic legal standards
have been, first, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”);48
second, Executive Order 12,333, which excluded the CIA from investi-
gation or surveillance of U.S. persons within the United States;49 and,
third, a series of domestic court decisions addressing non-core intelli-
gence activities, such as sexual discrimination within an intelligence
agency. These laws explicitly provide differing standards of regulation
depending upon citizenship and territoriality. As such, they reflect the
traditional conception of the demos that maintains that, as far as U.S.
law is concerned, only U.S. citizens in the United States fully “count.”
FISA is a notoriously complex law with many gray areas. However,
the overall import of FISA is disarmingly simple: it ensures that intelli-
gence surveillance within the United States complies with the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution. In other words, such surveillance re-
quires a warrant, supported by probable cause. The statute defines the
covered surveillance to include:
[T]he interception of international communications to a target
who is a United States person in the United States, wiretapping in
the United States, interception of the microwave portions of tele-
phone communications in the United States, and microphone,
closed-circuit television, or other forms of electronic monitoring of
activities in the United States, for the purpose of collecting foreign
intelligence.50
48. FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2006).
49. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 200, at § 2.4(a)–(d) (1981 Comp.), reprinted in
50 U.S.C. § 401, at 548 (1982) [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 12,333] (prohibiting the CIA,
and all other intelligence agencies except for intelligence units of the FBI, from con-
ducting their activities domestically, or against United States persons overseas unless those
targeted are reasonably believed to be agents of a foreign power).
50. William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical Searches for For-
eign Intelligence Purposes: Executive Order 12,333 and the Fourth Amendment, 35 CATH. U. L.
REV. 97, 157 (1985). The FISA’s full statutory definition of electronic surveillance is:
(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of
the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be re-
ceived by a particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if
the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person,
under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes;
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FISA defines a U.S. person to be a U.S. citizen; a lawful, perma-
nent alien; or associations made up of these persons.51 Thus, these
people receive fairly robust protections above and beyond the “inher-
ent authority” that presidents from Franklin D. Roosevelt52 to George
W. Bush have asserted. FISA represents the voluntary protection of
U.S. persons, even though that protection could conceivably under-
mine national security. It signals that these persons fall within the U.S.
demos, while non-citizens, those not protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment, fall outside the demos and outside the protections of the law.
Executive Order 12,333 states its concerns even more openly and
explicitly. Besides the aforementioned prohibition against conducting
intelligence activities domestically,53 a 2008 amendment to the order
states:
The United States Government has a solemn obligation, and shall
continue in the conduct of intelligence activities under this order,
to protect fully the legal rights of all United States persons, includ-
ing freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by Fed-
eral law.54
Executive Order 12,333 further defines “United States Person” to
mean a U.S. citizen or a “known” and “permanent” resident alien.55
Except for the addition of the qualifier “known” to “permanent resi-
(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of
the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States,
without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United
States . . . ;
(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device of the contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be
required for law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended
recipients are located within the United States; or
(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance de-
vice in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from
a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law en-
forcement purposes.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1) (2006).
51. Id. § 1801(i).
52. Robert A. Dawson, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Shifting the Balance: The D.C.
Circuit and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1380, 1382
n.11 (1993).
53. Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 49, § 2.4(a)–(d).
54. Exec. Order No. 13,470, § 1.1(b), 73 Fed. Reg. 45325 (July 30, 2008) (amending
Exec. Order No. 12,333 to update and clarify its regulation of U.S. intelligence activities)
[hereinafter Exec. Order No. 13,470].
55. Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 49, § 3.4(i).
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dent alien,” this definition is virtually identical to that found in FISA.56
Aliens abroad, thus, have no rights protection;57 nonpermanent resi-
dent aliens probably receive slightly more;58 permanent resident
aliens receive most of the protections of U.S. citizens;59 U.S. citizens
abroad receive fewer protections than U.S. citizens in the country;60
and U.S. citizens living in the United States receive a full complement
of protections.61
Since they stem from the political branches, FISA and Executive
Order 12,333 represent particularly potent expressions of the demos.
They presumptively derive from the general feelings of the U.S. popu-
lace and explicitly represent the feeling of the U.S. government as an
entity. That they define “United States person” in virtually identical
language gives a particularly strong indication of who is believed to
belong or not belong in the United States.
2. Domestic Court Decisions
Since the 1970s, lawsuits involving the CIA or another agency
have mostly involved activities where the CIA or another agency
caused an injury to U.S. citizens within the United States. As such,
they have either applied well-established claims to distinctive intelli-
gence activity or have simply involved intelligence agencies as litigants
in lawsuits stemming from matters such as employment and
discrimination.
Domestic suits stand in pointed contrast to the few cases brought
by foreign employees, primarily spies, against the CIA. For example,
in Guong v. United States (“Guong”),62 the plaintiff alleged he had en-
tered into an agreement with the CIA to help it prosecute its secret
56. FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2006).
57. Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 49, § 2.4(a)–(d), 3.4(i) (aliens abroad do not
qualify as U.S. persons and so do not benefit from the protections of the order).
58. Exec. Order No. 12,333 does not make any heightened standard of protection
explicit. However, surveillance, investigation, etc. of nonpermanent resident aliens within
the United States would be much more likely to touch on the “domestic activities” of U.S.
persons, and so would almost certainly be conducted with more circumspection than such
activities conducted abroad. Id. § 2.3(b).
59. Id. § 3.4(i) (giving “known” and “permanent” requirements). The difference in
these requirements would seem to provide intelligence agencies with a defense, or at least
an excuse, if they unknowingly spied on a permanent resident alien. Given the language of
the provision, though, there would not necessarily be a similar excuse for spying on a U.S.
citizen. Id.
60. See, e.g., id. § 2.3 (preventing intelligence collection concerning the domestic activi-
ties of U.S. persons, so not, presumably, the foreign activities of such persons).
61. Id. § 1.1; Exec. Order No. 13,470, supra note 54, § 1.3(b)(19).
62. 860 F.2d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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war behind North Vietnamese enemy lines.63 In return, Guong would
receive payment and the United States would rescue Guong if he were
captured.64 However, when the North Vietnamese captured Guong,
the United States neither rescued him nor continued payment to his
family.65 After escaping and after the CIA’s activities in Vietnam had
become public knowledge,66 Guong brought suit in 1986.67 The dis-
trict court ruled that Guong could not proceed with his lawsuit,68 as
the courts could not inquire into the sort of agreement Guong was
alleging due to the Totten privilege69—a Civil War-era privilege
prohibiting former agents from enforcing espionage deals against the
United States.
Guong stands in stark contrast with how the courts have tradition-
ally treated litigants from the United States. In the most famous such
case, Webster v. Doe (“Webster”),70 a “covert electronics technician,” em-
ployed under a secret contract, brought suit against the government
for discrimination based upon sexual orientation.71 Although the fact
and terms of the plaintiff’s employment remained secret72—which is
to say, more “secret” than the facts surrounding Guong’s employ-
ment73—the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Webster could proceed
with his suit. As Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned, the case would raise
serious constitutional questions if Webster were denied his day in
court. As A. John Radsan pointed out, even though the Court defined
the CIA’s interests in secrecy in the case as “extraordinary,” it felt
Webster’s right to due process outweighed these interests.74 Indeed,
63. Id. at 1064.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1065; see also Ralph L. Stavins, A Special Supplement: Kennedy’s Private War, 17
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 1, July 22, 1971, available at http://www.nybooks.com/arti-
cles/10494 (describing CIA and other covert operations in North Vietnam and Laos which
occurred more than a decade before the Guong decision).
67. Guong, 860 F.2d at 1064.
68. Id. at 1067.
69. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875). The Totten privilege is related to,
but conceptually distinct from, the state secrets privilege. See A. John Radsan, Second-Guess-
ing the Spymasters with a Judicial Role in Espionage Deals, 91 IOWA. L. REV. 1259, 1274–82
(2006) (detailing how the Totten privilege sometimes seems like a subset of the state secrets
privilege, and sometimes seems like a separate privilege).
70. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
71. Id. at 594–95.
72. Id.
73. Guong, 860 F.2d at 1064–65.
74. Webster, 486 U.S. at 604 (holding that “[t]he District Court has the latitude to
control any discovery process which may be instituted so as to balance respondent’s need
for access to proof which would support a colorable constitutional claim against the ex-
Winter 2010] LEGAL COSMOPOLITANISM & INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 615
since Webster, the CIA and other intelligence agencies have become
liable to a wide variety of civil actions brought by their domestic em-
ployees, both overt and covert.75
These cases illustrate the extremely limited conception of the de-
mos. If the United States breaks a secret agreement with a foreign
person, that injury would seem just as real as that arising from, for
example, employment discrimination. The easiest explanation of the
difference is that courts may feel that it is somehow inappropriate for
the foreign beneficiaries of secret agreements to bring suit against the
United States. Additionally, part of the courts’ reluctance stems from
its own legitimate conception of its role, i.e. as the branch with the
least power and least competence in national security affairs. How-
ever, courts have regulated national security, and have done to a very
large extent in recent years. Furthermore, that conception stems di-
rectly from a legal system that gives foreign persons abroad much less
legal recourse than U.S. citizens within the country. So while courts
may not have led the way in creating this limited conception of the
demos, they have operated in ways that very much reinforce it.
3. Applying the Constitution Abroad
In an area where courts play an almost-exclusive role—deciding
where the Constitution runs—they have acted with the same sliding-
scale demos as the political branches in regulating intelligence. Most
importantly, courts have consistently held the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies to some situations abroad. United States citizens receive the most
robust protections when abroad, while foreign citizens with no con-
nection to the United States receive the least; and foreign citizens with
substantial connections to the United States fall somewhere in
between.
This sliding-scale is not absolute. First, the regulation on overseas
intelligence searches of U.S. citizens is not stringent. To date, there
has been only one court of appeals case addressing the overseas sur-
veillance of a U.S. citizen for intelligence purposes and without the
involvement of local authorities. In In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Em-
bassies in East Africa,76 the Second Circuit ruled the U.S. government,
when spying on U.S. citizens abroad, need only meet the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness (as opposed to its warrant) require-
traordinary needs of the CIA for confidentiality and the protection of its methods, sources,
and mission”).
75. See Manget, supra note 44.
76. 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
616 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
ment.77 The Second Circuit further interpreted reasonableness as a
balancing test between the government’s interests in national security
and the individual’s privacy rights.78 Especially since the court said it
was loathe to question the government’s characterization of the na-
tional security interest,79 this test heavily favors the government.80 The
Supreme Court, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,81 held the Fourth
Amendment imposed no restrictions on searches of non-citizens
abroad even when, as in that case, the non-citizen is subsequently
brought to the United States for trial.82
Second, the Fourth Amendment mainly applies to bar improperly
gathered evidence during litigation. Intelligence agencies do not gen-
erally involve themselves in criminal prosecutions, and therefore, the
information they gather rarely finds its way into courtrooms.83 Al-
though the Fourth Amendment provides only weak protection, it is
better than the complete lack of protection traditionally afforded
non-U.S. citizens abroad.
B. Intelligence in International Law: (Un)Constructive Ambiguity
The body of international law of intelligence—in both its peace-
time and wartime incarnations—fails to provide meaningful regula-
tion of intelligence. Therefore, courts have applied either the law of
war or human rights law.
1. Peacetime Intelligence
Despite intelligence’s ancient pedigree and arguable usefulness
in maintaining peace and security,84 it has rarely received a positive
77. Id. at 167.
78. Id. at 175.
79. Id. at 167.
80. But cf. United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995) (ruling that for
joint U.S. and foreign intelligence operations, “reasonableness” means compliance with
local law).
81. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
82. Id. at 261.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 CR. 1023(LBS.), 2001 WL 30061,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2001) (The government “assured the [District] Court that it d[id]
not intend to offer any of this [intelligence] evidence in its case-in-chief and . . . also
indicated that there [we]re ‘no ‘fruits’ from the FISA tree with respect to [the defendant]
El-Hage.’”). Furthermore, the CIA is explicitly barred from engaging in law enforcement
activity under the National Security Act of 1947. See 50 U.S.C. § 403-4a(d)(1) (2006) (The
CIA “shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or Internal security
functions.”).
84. W. Hays Parks, The International Law of Intelligence Collection, in NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW 433–34 (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 1990) (“Nations collect intelli-
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treatment under international law. Instead, international law has tra-
ditionally regarded spies with something approaching disgust, while
nevertheless permitting states to use them. Hugo Grotius, for exam-
ple, noted the personal criminal liability of spies dates from at least
Roman times, but that nations have never been punished for sending
them.85 Grotius makes the moral sentiment even more explicit. He
writes, “[T]hose who avail themselves of the aid of bad men against an
enemy are thought to sin before God, but not before men; that is,
they are thought not to commit wrong against the law of nations, be-
cause in such cases—Custom has brought law beneath its sway . . . .”86
The only significant development in the international law of in-
telligence is that the moral sentiment that permeates Grotius has
largely been dropped. Oppenheim’s treatise states that, around mid-
century, peaceful intelligence operations were not considered wrong
“morally, politically, or legally.”87 This is also the consensus of most
modern scholars.88
2. Wartime Intelligence
Geneva law punishes, but does not outlaw, spying.89 It deprives
spies of full POW status90 and gives them less protection than regular
gence to deter or minimize the likelihood of surprise attack; to facilitate diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and military action, in defense of a nation in the event of hostilities; and in times of
‘neither peace nor war,’ to deter or defend against actions by individuals, groups, or a
nation that would constitute a threat to international peace and security (such as acts of
terrorism).”).
85. III HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE: De Jure Belli ac Pacis (Claren-
don Press 1925), available at http://www.archive.org/stream/hugonisgrottiide02grotuoft/
hugonisgrottiide02grotuoft_djvu.txt.
86. Id. at 655.
87. OPPENHEIM, supra note 43, at 862.
88. See Glen Sulmasy & John Yoo, Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and Interna-
tional Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 625 (2007); see also Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in
from the Cold War: Intelligence and International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1071 (2006); Com-
mander Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law, 46
A.F. L. REV. 217 (1999); Lt. Col. Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321 (1996).
89. ICRC COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 43, at 564. The Red
Cross Commentary to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions speaks of the “dia-
lectic of espionage.” It then goes on to state: “resorting to this method of combat is not
prohibited. Yet, despite (”notwithstanding“) the other provisions of the Conventions and
the Protocol, any member of the armed forces who is caught while he is engaged in espio-
nage may be deprived of his prisoner-of-war status and punished.” Id. at 563.
90. Id.; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 46, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
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civilians,91 but does not deprive them of all rights.92 Nevertheless, the
Geneva Conventions explicitly punish many intelligence-type activi-
ties. They not only penalize spying and sabotage (as above), but also
perfidy93 and terrorism.94 To the extent intelligence operations re-
semble non-intelligence criminal operations, intelligence operations
are punished criminally. The obvious exceptions are the provisions
specifically penalizing spies and saboteurs.
Thus, in war as in peace, the structure of the international law of
intelligence remains the same: nations may both send their own spies
and punish the spies of others. Two salient points emerge. First, such
regulation more-or-less explicitly allows a nation to privilege its own
nationals (or agents) over the nationals (or agents) of other nations.
A nation may send the former without attracting opprobrium, while
severely punishing the latter, even if both are engaged in the exact
same activity. Second, because foreign intelligence activity is generally
illegal within the nation in which it is carried out, there is little if any
opportunity to regulate the conduct of intelligence.
3. Attempts to Regulate
International law of intelligence is actually poorly suited to regu-
late intelligence. Thus, much of the substantive regulation of intelli-
gence comes from other bodies of law, specifically under either the
rubric of the law of war or under human rights law.
a. Intelligence and War
The CIA and other intelligence agencies will probably not abide
by the law of war until the CIA internalizes the value of IHL. Despite
the CIA’s inception of the Office of Strategic Services (“OSS”) during
91. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (“Where in occupied territory an
individual protected person is detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite
suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in
those cases where absolute military necessity so requires, be regarded as having forfeited
rights of communication under the present Convention.”) [hereinafter Geneva Conven-
tion IV Protection of Civilian Persons].
92. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 90, art. 75 (“In so far as they are affected
by a situation referred to in Article 1 of this Protocol, persons who are in the power of a
Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the
Conventions or this Protocol shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall en-
joy, as a minimum, the protection provided by this Article . . . .”).
93. Id. art. 37(1).
94. Id. art. 51(2) (“Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”).
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World War II, IHL has only nominally applied to CIA activities.95
These agencies, as paramilitaries, have either fought unacknowledged
wars or unacknowledged parts in acknowledged wars. CIA’s activities
in Nicaragua during the 1980s96 is an example of the former; while
CIA activities in Laos during the Vietnam War97 or in Afghanistan dur-
ing Operation Enduring Freedom98 are examples of the latter.
Yet these distinctions do not affect how IHL applies. Most schol-
ars agree that a legal declaration of war99 does not affect the existence
of a state of war in international law.100 Moreover, even if a war has
begun illegally, or in secret, the law on how to conduct war, the jus in
bello, applies in full.101 In addition, the U.N. Charter—the primary
law governing the initiation of hostilities—speaks of threats to “inter-
national peace and security,102 not in terms of declared wars or ac-
knowledged armed conflicts. As such, once an entity engages in
hostilities, the law of war governs its activities.
Thus, when an intelligence agency conducts paramilitary activi-
ties, the law of war applies to it. It is difficult to find examples of courts
successfully applying these laws. In Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicaragua v. United States),103 the International Court of Justice
95. Col. Kathryn Stone, “All Necessary Means”—Employing CIA Operatives in a Warfighting
Role Alongside Special Operations Forces 9 (U.S. Army War College, Project Paper, 2003)
(“‘CIA’ support to military operations originated during World War II, with the creation of
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which built for its own use a covert paramilitary
force.”).
96. Nathan Hodge, CIA’s Predatory Behavior is Cause for Concern, NEWSDAY, June 6, 2002,
at A49 (noting that during the 1980s, the CIA conducted paramilitary operations in Nicara-
gua and elsewhere that completely bypassed the Combatant Commander of the U.S.
Southern Command); see also Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 118–19 (June 27) (wherein the Interna-
tional Court of Justice ruled the United States had violated Nicaragua’s sovereignty by
supporting paramilitaries there).
97. THOMAS L. AHERN, JR., UNDERCOVER ARMIES: CIA AND SURROGATE WARFARE IN LAOS
1961–1973, at xv (2006) (Noting the CIA both worked with native Hmong guerillas in Laos
during the Vietnam war, and used its own paramilitary forces on the ground. In neither
case did the United States admit this activity until well after the fact.).
98. See Greg Miller, CIA Expanding Presence in Afghanistan, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2009,
available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-intel20-2009
sep20,0,6061626,full.story.
99. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the power to declare
war).
100. See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modern International Law,
36 INT. & COMP. L.Q. 283, 283–306 (1983).
101. Id.
102. U.N. Charter art. 1, para., art. 2, para. 6.
103. Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 118–19 (June 27).
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(“ICJ”) ruled that U.S. intelligence activities in Nicaragua violated Nic-
araguan sovereignty and the law of war.104 But the case had, at best, a
limited effect as the United States did not accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction
to decide the matter105 and did not abide by the decision. Indeed, one
can question the theoretical appropriateness of applying IHL to intel-
ligence operations in this way. Because paramilitary activities are usu-
ally both secret and illegal, it is doubtful courts could effectively apply
the law of war to them until intelligence services, or their political
masters, consciously decide to submit to such regulation.
The law of war provides for some regulation of intelligence activi-
ties, but only by prohibiting narrow classes of acts. Nevertheless, it of-
fers a further possibility of regulation by eschewing any distinction in
application between declared and undeclared wars, or war and other
activity that threatens international peace and security.
b. Intelligence and Human Rights
Non-U.S. courts, specifically the ECHR, have regulated intelli-
gence and counter-terrorism activities under human rights law. Most
importantly, they have extended the jurisdiction of human rights in-
struments, such as the European Convention, to all those under the
“effective control” of a subject government. Such a move has opened
the way for a wide variety of human rights claims against those en-
gaged in intelligence or counter-terrorism. As a result, these courts
have banned or curtailed many intelligence practices related to rendi-
tion, detention, and interrogation.
And of course, jus cogens norms of human rights can be applied
systematically to intelligence activity without much modification. Like
the jus ad bellum, these rules apply to a maximum number of actions
with a minimum of distinction and focus on broad prohibitions of the
worst sorts of activity.106 In particular, the fairly uncontested jus
cogens prohibition on torture107 unquestionably applies to, and
104. Id. at 147.
105. Id. at 17.
106. But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702 (1987) (stating that “[a] state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy,
it practices, encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the mur-
der or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic ra-
cial discrimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights”).
107. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Address, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing Interna-
tional Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 664 (1998) (describing the prohibition on torture
as a jus cogens norm of international law).
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would prohibit, the dirtiest sort of intelligence activities. At the very
least, it should provide an uncontested basis for regulation, but the
CIA has not felt bound by the legal prohibition on torture.108
It is difficult to enforce jus cogens human rights norms for essen-
tially two related reasons. First, other jus cogens norms arguably pro-
tect even some “dirty” intelligence operations. As sometimes
formulated, the right of self-determination includes both a right of
armed struggle against colonial oppression and a broader right to en-
gage otherwise terrorist violence against forces deemed especially op-
pressive.109 Thus, depending on how construed, these rights and
exceptions actually protect otherwise illegal intelligence activity, de-
pending on against whom that activity is directed and by whom it is
conducted.
Second, determining the scope of jus cogens rules is notoriously
difficult. Outside the prohibitions on torture, genocide, and slavery,
few people agree on what qualifies, and no rules exist on how to rec-
oncile conflicting peremptory norms.110 Even within these prohibi-
tions, courts have had difficulty in formulating enforceable rules. For
108. William Ranney Levi, Interrogation’s Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1434, 1439 (2009) (“For the
fifty years prior to 9/11, the United States consistently professed high ideals about its inter-
rogation policies but at the same time authorized aggressive interrogation policies when
the security threat seemed . . . to warrant them.”). See generally CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, KUBARK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION 93–95 (1963), http://www.gwu.
edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/#kubark (authorizing use of “electric methods” of
interrogation, among other highly aggressive techniques.).
109. See, e.g., Organization of the Islamic Conference, Convention on the Organization
of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism art. 2(a), July 1, 1999,
Annex to Resolution No. 59/26-P, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3de
5e6646.html (“Peoples’ struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, ag-
gression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accor-
dance with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime.”);
Organization of African Unity, OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of
Terrorism art 3, June 14, 1999, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f4b1f7
14.html (“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, the struggle waged by peoples in
accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determina-
tion, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domina-
tion by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts.”).
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
(1987) (listing prohibitions on genocide, slavery, disappearances, torture and CID treat-
ment, “prolonged arbitrary detention,” systematic racial discrimination, and gross human
rights violations as jus cogens). But see Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995
I.C.J. 90 (June 30) (“In the Court’s view, Portugal’s assertion that the right of peoples to
self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has
an erga omnes character, is irreproachable. . . . [I]t is one of the essential principles of
contemporary international law.”). See also Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The
Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 63 (1993) (arguing, in part, that the prohibition on
gender discrimination should be recognized as a jus cogens right).
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instance, U.S. courts are required to follow an extremely high stan-
dard of specificity in directly applying international law,111 making the
application of jus cogens standards even more problematic in the U.S.
context.
C. The CIA’s Legal Self-Image and Past Practices
To the extent that one can tell from public information, the CIA
has not understood itself to be bound by international law, and thus
has operated in a way that reflects a conception of the demos deeply
at odds with legal cosmopolitanism. As a result, it has conducted its
international operations outside legal constraints, except, as in cases
like Iran-Contra, where those international operations had a major
domestic component.112 This is not to say that the CIA is either cruel
or rogue—just that it has operated within the legal framework given
to it and has taken more account of the rights of U.S. persons than of
non-U.S. persons.
The CIA is relatively unique among intelligence agencies in its
extensive and public self-reflection. In the past decade, the CIA has
published on its website extensive, previously classified materials deal-
ing with past operations, practices, doctrines, and internal debates.
This material allows scholars to identify how the CIA understood its
role and the limitations of that role. A picture emerges of an Agency
that responds to domestic law and recognizes domestic legal obliga-
tions, but that gives very little thought to international law. Thus,
while courts and others have attempted to apply IHL to CIA activi-
ties,113 these efforts have barely penetrated its consciousness. This la-
cuna testifies to the remarkable lack of practically effective regulation
of intelligence under international law.
The CIA is most blatant regarding paramilitary operations that
violate the jus ad bellum, the jus in bello, or both. For example, the
CIA has published the personal reminiscences of a field operative,
Richard L. Holm, fighting the “secret war” in Laos during the Viet-
111. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 723–25 (2004) (“[W]e think courts should
require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of interna-
tional character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable
to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”).
112. See IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. NO. 100-433, S. REP. NO. 100-216, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1988).
113. See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (International Court of Justice applying IHL stan-
dards to U.S. activities in Nicaragua, including those by the CIA).
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nam War.114 He describes crossing the Laotian border, embedding
himself with anti-Communist forces in that country, and carrying out
operations against North Vietnam in both Laos and in Vietnam itself.
Because Laos was not directly or officially involved in hostilities,
Holm’s actions and the larger CIA operation would run afoul of most
interpretations of the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on violating the ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of a state.115 For example,
Holm describes repeatedly crossing the Laotian border to help facili-
tate military operations116 in that neutral country. What is more,
Holm describes fighting alongside forces that likely met none of the
requirements for lawful combatancy.117 This is not to say that some
entity ought to prosecute Holm, or even that, as a policy matter, the
CIA should not have conducted such operations. After all, the Viet-
nam War grew from longstanding U.S. commitments, involved ex-
tremely high stakes, and witnessed IHL violations by enemy forces far
worse than anything the U.S. perpetrated,118 including violations of
the neutrality of Laos. But it is a cornerstone of IHL that the same
rules apply to all sides, regardless of past violations, or violations by
114. Richard L. Holm, Recollections of a Case Officer in Laos, 1962–1964, 47 STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE 1, 1–2 (2003), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-
of-intelligence/kent-csi/pdf/v47i1a01p.pdf.
115. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
116. Holm, supra note 114, at 9 (“Early in my tour at Nakhon Phanom, I would have
my team leaders come to Thailand to met [sic] with me. Then, I began making trips into
Laos at night. Finally, I began to cross the river into Laos regularly during the day. I never
carried a passport or other identification. No one, least of all the border officials, ever
questioned me about what I was doing.”).
117. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949, art. 4(A)(2), 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S 135 (“Prisoners of war, in the sense of the
present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have
fallen into the power of the enemy: . . . Members of other militias and members of other
volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party
to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occu-
pied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance
movements, fulfil [sic] the following conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accor-
dance with the laws and customs of war.”) [hereinafter Geneva Convention Treatment of
Prisoners of War]; see also W. Hays Parks, Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 493 (2003) (observing, inter alia, that combatants have some flexibility in meet-
ing these requirements that clearly extend protection beyond the regularly constituted
armed forces of a recognized state).
118. See, e.g., Jonathan Mahler, The Lives They Lived; The Prisoner, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25,
2005, at 39 (Magazine) (“The North Vietnamese knew they were overmatched militarily,
but they figured they could at least win the propaganda war by brutalizing American
P.O.W.’s until they denounced their government and ‘confessed’ that they had bombed
schoolchildren and villagers.”).
624 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
the enemy.119 Yet not only did the CIA not abide by IHL, but also it
never seems to have realized its transgression.120
A similar dynamic informs the CIA’s treatment of interrogation.
The use of torture is disclaimed because the technique is ineffective
and better ones are available, not because it is immoral or illegal.121
Unclassified CIA documents extensively discuss both interrogation122
and the use of mind-altering drugs in interrogation,123 both well after
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment established general international
definition for torture and related treatment.124 As with the other doc-
uments, the CIA author takes a measured and analytical approach to
the question, but without interest in how the use of such drugs might
violate international law by inducing the severe mental suffering char-
acteristic of torture.125 Moreover, none of these documents mention
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, or the Geneva provisions
119. Greenwood, supra note 100, at 289.
120. See Albert E. Riffice, Intelligence and Covert Action, 6 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE 73
(1962), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
csi/vol6no1/pdf/v06i1a06p.pdf. Here, and in Holm’s account of British military opera-
tions, the authors overwhelmingly worry about the practical success of various tactics, while
international law plays no role in the analysis, and so, presumably, no part in the planning
or evaluation of operations. Id.; Holm, supra note 114, at 3, 13, 16.
121. Don Compos, The Interrogation of Suspects Under Arrest, 2 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
51, 51 (1958), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/
kent-csi/vol2no3/pdf/v02i3a08p.pdf (“The recalcitrant subject of an intelligence interro-
gation must be ‘broken’ but broken for use like a riding horse, not smashed in the search
for a single golden egg.”).
122. GROTIUS, supra note 85, at 655 (Convention Against Torture was submitted for
Senate ratification in 1984); see also Ireland v. United Kingdom, judgment of Jan. 18, 1978,
Ser. A no. 25 (European Court of Human Rights case establishing highly case-specific stan-
dard for determining CID treatment. Such a case-specific standard would only raise the
likelihood that a given CIA activity would violate international law.); Mark Bowden, The
Dark Art of Interrogation, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2003, at 51, 55–56.
123. Bowden, supra note 122, at 51 (“According to [Bowden’s] intelligence sources,
drugs are today sometimes used to assist in critical interrogations, and the preferred ones
are methamphetamines tempered with barbiturates and cannabis.”); George Bimmerle,
“Truth” Drugs in Interrogation, 5 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE 2, at A1 (1961), available at https:/
/www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol5no2/pdf/v05i2a0
9p.pdf.
124. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, art. 1, adopted on Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987) (defining “‘torture’ [as] any act by which
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted . . . .”) [here-
inafter Convention Against Torture].
125. Id.; see also Pratt v. Attorney Gen. for Jamaica, [1993] A.C. 1 (P.C.) (Privy Council
decision holding that the length and conditions of confinement on death row could lead
to mental suffering that would violate the ban on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment).
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that almost certainly ban the use of such drugs.126 Although the au-
thors of these documents disclaim cruelty in the every day understand-
ing of that term, they show neither knowledge of, nor concern for,
techniques that might meet the legal definition of torture, CID treat-
ment, or other prohibited conduct.
These attitudes differ markedly from the extensive Law of War
program in the U.S. armed forces. Thus, unlike the uniformed mili-
tary, the CIA has viewed itself as an agency separate from the concerns
of international law. This separation is due in part to the strange rela-
tionship of international law to intelligence activity. Yet even where
neutral, jus cogens legal standards existed, the CIA seems to have ig-
nored them as irrelevant to its activities.
D. Intelligence, the Law, and the Demos
In view of the narrow prohibitions contained in the Geneva Con-
ventions and the lack of effective regulation under customary IHL,
the law of war does not explicitly affect most intelligence activity. Simi-
larly, the peacetime international law of intelligence leaves most prac-
tices undisturbed. Each nation is permitted to send its own spies,
while simultaneously punishing the spies of all other nations. The
shape of domestic intelligence law, at least in the United States, gives
some insight into this situation. The National Security Act of 1947,
FISA, and Executive Order 12,333 give robust protection to U.S. citi-
zens within the United States, but offer no protection to foreign re-
sidents abroad, who are, likely, the primary target of foreign
intelligence activity.
Such a situation presents a problem for those who want to regu-
late foreign intelligence activity, or believe that at least some nonresi-
dent aliens deserve the protection of U.S. law. The body of
intelligence law is extremely troublesome in its extremely limited con-
ception of the demos and targeting of foreign nationals for surveil-
lance, detention without charge, and other intelligence activities. It
126. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War August 12,
1949, supra note 117, art. 13 (“Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. . . .
In particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or
scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital
treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.”); id. art. 17 (“No
physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners
of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse
to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous
treatment of any kind.”).
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would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile one
with the other in their present form.
III. Putting Intelligence Under the Laws of War
The CCR and other concerned groups have brought a number of
lawsuits against the U.S. government, seeking to establish the rights of
the nonresident aliens detained at Guanta´namo under either a law of
war or constitutional law framework. At the same time, the Executive
Branch—while opposing these lawsuits—has extended the Geneva
Conventions to interrogation of all detainees in U.S. custody and an-
nounced a policy regarding the targeting of terrorists that closely re-
flects humanitarian law.
The United States has moved a considerable way toward putting
anti-terror and intelligence operations under the law of war. Even
though domestic intelligence law is available, its reliance on tradi-
tional principles of territoriality and citizenship, as well as its inability
to regulate certain intelligence activities, make it inadequate.
Legal cosmopolitanism asserts that intelligence activities ought to
be regulated because they profoundly affect their objects, such as
those interrogated or detained. However, legal cosmopolitanism does
not dictate what body of law ought to regulate such activities. Intelli-
gence is often best regulated not as intelligence, but as something
else. In bits and pieces, courts have first expanded their jurisdiction
and then used this new power to apply the law of war to areas to intel-
ligence and anti-terror activities. The Executive Branch has picked up
on this development and has either voluntarily instituted law of war
standards of its own or used the law of war to justify ongoing policies.
In any case, many of the most significant GWOT activities have come
under a legal regime originally designed for the declared clash of ar-
mies on the field of battle.127
These laws and regulations reflect some previously seen analytical
moves. Courts in Europe have tended to regulate intelligence and
anti-terrorism activities under a human rights framework, while others
have sought to regulate intelligence under the law of war. U.S. legal
actors have unconsciously developed a hybrid procedure: The jurisdic-
tional logic of GWOT decisions focus on an effective control test for
establishing jurisdiction, similar to the European Court of Human
127. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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Rights,128 while U.S. courts and the Executive, when applying substan-
tive law, have opted for applying the law of war to intelligence. In
either case, the animating concerns are a concern for the rights of
Guanta´namo (and now Bagram129) detainees, with a desire on the
part of the courts to limit executive power and put matters under a
more clearly legal framework.
A. Setting the Stage: Hamdan and Boumediene, Again
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Hamdan130 and
Boumediene131 have been the most celebrated, and reviled, part of
GWOT jurisprudence. They have also set the stage for many of the
most important developments in intelligence and anti-terrorism law in
the past few years. Although the cases do not necessarily appear con-
sistent with one another, a reading based around legal cosmopolitan-
ism sheds light on both the internal logic of the cases and many of
their peculiar analytic features. In the end, these cases not only
demonstrate a deeply cosmopolitan tendency, they also reflect many
of the same trends and logical maneuvers used by non-U.S. courts and
agencies.
Hamdan provided one of the earliest and most prominent mani-
festations of cosmopolitan legal concerns. Those opposed to the Bush
Administration policy have argued the Geneva Conventions should
protect all Guanta´namo detainees, at least under Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions (“CA3”), if not as full prisoners of war.
The Supreme Court adopted the former position in Hamdan,132 but
has not yet accepted the latter. Indeed, the commentary to the Ge-
neva Conventions seems to indicate that the Geneva Convention
would not cover the al-Qaeda detainees133 (and the Conventions
128. See, e.g., O¨calan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, May 12, 2005, Eur. Ct. H.R.
2005–IV; Ramirez-Sanchez v. France, no. 28780/95, Comm’n Decision of June 24, 1996,
DR 155; Ireland v. United Kingdom, judgment of Jan. 18, 1978, Ser. A no. 25; Al-Skeini v.
Sec’y of State for Defence [2007] A.C. 153.
129. Anthony J. Colangelo, “De facto Sovereignty”: Boumediene and Beyond, 77 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 623, 675 (2009).
130. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
131. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229.
132. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631.
133. Additional Protocol I, supra note 90, art. 44(4) (“A combatant who falls into the
power of an adverse Party while failing to meet the requirements set forth in the second
sentence of paragraph 3 [of, primarily, carrying arms openly during combat] shall forfeit
his right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given protections equivalent
in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention and by this
Protocol. This protection includes protections equivalent to those accorded to prisoners of
war by the Third Convention in the case where such a person is tried and punished for any
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themselves mention only terrorism as a prohibited tactic134 without
mentioning “terrorists”). The extension of protection under CA3 in
Hamdan thus constitutes cosmopolitanism of the first kind, i.e. an ex-
panded demos.
The second kind—requiring more legal actors to expand the ju-
risdiction of the courts—can be seen in the developments from
Hamdan to Boumediene. It deals with the Supreme Court’s current sep-
aration-of-powers jurisprudence: a belief that all three branches
should be involved in momentous decisions. This means, in practice,
more legislation from Congress and more decisions from the courts.
In the Hamdan decision, the Supreme Court faced a realm of rela-
tively pure executive action and demanded the Executive include
Congress.135 After Congress was included, the Court then, in
Boumediene, demanded the judiciary be included as well, in the form
of extending constitutional habeas rights to the Guanta´namo detain-
offences he has committed.”). The Commentaries state, “[s]everal representatives [to the
conference drafting Additional Protocol I] made the point that this paragraph is not, in
any event, intended to protect terrorists who act clandestinely to attack the civilian popula-
tion.” ICRC COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 43, at 538; see also Geof-
frey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid
Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 295, 295 (2006) (“For more than fifty
years following the 1949 revision of the Geneva Conventions, legal scholars, government
experts, and military practitioners understood the articles that defined when the protec-
tions of these treaties came into force—Common Articles 2 and 3—as the exclusive criteria
which triggered the laws of war. From these two articles emerged an ‘either/or’ law-appli-
cability paradigm: inter-state, or international, armed conflicts triggered the full corpus of
the law of war, whereas intra-state, or internal, armed conflicts triggered the limited hu-
manitarian protection reflected in the terms of Common Article 3.”). Therefore, the con-
flict with al-Qaeda does not fit any of these paradigms because its transnational nature;
therefore, the traditional criteria for determining the applicability of Common Article 3 is
inapplicable. Corn, supra, at 296; Roy S. Scho¨ndorf, Extra-State Armed Conflict: Is There a Need
for a New Legal Regime?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4 (2004) (“Thus, in the present state
of affairs—for example, in a conflict like that between the United States and [a]l-Qaeda—
the usefulness of traditional [law of war] dichotomies begins to break down, and a whole
array of uncertainties arises. When extra-state hostilities erupt, does international law rec-
ognize this as an armed conflict, or is the legal status of the situation still one of peace? If
there is an armed conflict under international law, what kind of armed conflict is it—inter-
state or intra-state? Or is it neither—that is, should international law recognize a third,
more appropriate category of armed conflicts? If so, which existing laws should apply to
this new category?”).
134. Geneva Convention IV Protection of Civilian Persons, supra note 91, art. 33; Proto-
col Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 4(2), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
135. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The Court’s conclusion ulti-
mately rests upon a single ground: Congress has not issued the Executive a ‘blank
check.’”).
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ees.136 On one reading of these cases, the Court has acted disingenu-
ously, giving the Executive false signals, and partially contradicting
itself. More plausibly, however, these decisions share a unifying con-
cern with, and preference for, law and legal supervision over policy
and political supervision.
In Hamdan, the Court purported to use the tripartite framework
developed in Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer (“Youngstown”)137 to evaluate the legality of the intelli-
gence activities at issue in the case. The Court showed a very strong
preference for Youngstown category one: the President acting pursuant
to express congressional authorization and so receiving the highest
level of deference.138 Which is to say, even when, as here, there was
ample evidence of informal congressional acquiescence (category
two),139 the Court demanded the President go back for more. Indeed,
Congress had arguably formally authorized the Executive’s action
through the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005140 and
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”),141 and the President,
therefore, was at the height of his national security power.142 This de-
cision does not show, however, that the Court acted in bad faith.
Rather, it only shows that it did not read the law technically. It found
that congressional approval was not sufficient; active congressional in-
volvement and oversight was required.143
136. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261.
137. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 635 (“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authoriza-
tion of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”).
139. Id. at 637 (“When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers . . . . [But], con-
gressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter,
enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.”).
140. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 2739; see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 678
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that, under a Youngstown analysis, the DTA, as congres-
sional authorization for executive policies, ought to put the President at the height of his
powers).
141. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
142. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636–37.
143. See, e.g., Kathleen Duignan, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: ‘Play it Again, [Un-
cle] Sam’, JURIST, Dec. 12, 2006, at 1, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/
12/military-commissions-act-of-2006-play.php (“After the Supreme Court decided Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld in June 2006, academics, law of war experts, military justice practitioners, and
everyday concerned citizens were eagerly awaiting congressional action to cure the defi-
ciencies in the previous system or sanction the use of courts-martial or civilian courts to try
the fraction of those detained at Guanta´namo awaiting trial. Instead, Congress acted politi-
cally. Instead of carefully deliberating and taking as much time as it needed to get the
system right, Congress hastily created and passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006.”).
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Boumediene reinforces this point. Through the MCA, Congress
unambiguously endorsed the President’s detainee policy.144 Many
commentators characterized the MCA as a direct response to Hamdan,
and especially Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion that asserted the
only deficiency in the detainee policy was a lack of congressional in-
volvement.145 Again, under a literal reading of Youngstown, the Presi-
dent was at the height of his national security power after the MCA,
and, under a literal reading of Hamdan, Congress had fulfilled that
opinion’s conditions for approval. Nevertheless, in Boumediene, the
Court ruled this joint presidential and congressional action
inadequate.146
Some critics of the decision—including Chief Justice Roberts—
accused the Court of a straightforward bait-and-switch.147 Yet the prac-
tical aspects of the opinions make this unlikely. First, the same Justices
comprised the majorities on both Hamdan and Boumediene.148 Second,
the Boumediene litigation was already in the lower courts when Hamdan
came down, and the core question of Boumediene—do Guanta´namo
detainees have constitutional habeas rights?—had been pregnant
since at least Rasul149 (handed down two years before Hamdan150 and
four before Boumediene151) that held statutory habeas corpus rights ex-
tended to Guanta´namo.152 Thus, given a constant set of majority Jus-
tices in Hamdan and Boumediene and a clear progression of cases, it is
more plausible to describe the Court’s decisions as stemming from a
common ongoing concern, rather than from fickleness or inepti-
144. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 2, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (“The
authority to establish military commissions under chapter 47A of title 10, United States
Code, as added by section 3(a), may not be construed to alter or limit the authority of the
President under the Constitution of the United States and laws of the United States to
establish military commissions . . . .”).
145. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636.
146. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008) (“If the privilege of habeas
corpus is to be denied to the detainees now before us, Congress must act in accordance
with the requirements of the Suspension Clause. . . . The MCA does not purport to be a
formal suspension of the writ; and the Government, in its submissions to us, has not argued
that it is. Petitioners, therefore, are entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge
the legality of their detention.” (internal citations omitted)).
147. Id. at 2285 (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alioto, JJ., dissenting) (“Congress fol-
lowed the Court’s lead, only to find itself the victim of a constitutional bait and switch.”).
148. Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (consisting of a majority comprised of Justices Stevens, Sou-
ter, Ginsburg, and Breyer); Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (consisting of a majority comprised
of Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer).
149. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
150. Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557.
151. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229.
152. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 482.
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tude—especially since common principles such as concern for the de-
tainees and a strong normative preference for law and legal
oversight—emerge naturally from these cases.
This preference goes beyond the Youngstown framework. Under
that framework, the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the MCA
should have led to the strongest possible deference to the joint action
from the Executive and Congress. As Justice Kennedy pointed out in
his majority opinion, as a historical matter, the question of whether
habeas rights extended to Guanta´namo was ambiguous.153 It was also
ambiguous under the Court’s past precedents.154 This combination of
ambiguous law and category one action ought to have been a victory
for the Executive.155 Because it was not, the Court was likely not using
a formal Youngstown analysis. Reading these cases as emanations of
legal cosmopolitanism, however, renders them consistent with each
other and with the expressed concerns of most of the current Justices.
Such a reading covers both the extension of current law (CA3) to
cover Guanta´namo (Hamdan156), and the belief that detainees deserve
to enforce their rights through Article III courts (Boumediene157).
This outcome, and its reasoning, also reflects a similar jurisdic-
tional framework to international cases. The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, has a different substantive law: instead of international
human rights law, the U.S. Supreme Court has restricted itself to juris-
dictional issues,158 while lower courts have applied not human rights
law, but a restrictive version of IHL.
153. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2248 (“Diligent search by all parties reveals no certain
conclusions. In none of the cases cited do we find that a common-law court would or
would not have granted, or refused to hear for lack of jurisdiction, a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus brought by a prisoner deemed an enemy combatant, under a standard like
the one the Department of Defense has used in these cases, and when held in a territory,
like Guantanamo, over which the Government has total military and civil control.”).
154. See id. at 2254–58 (reviewing the highly ambiguous and fact-dependent way in
which jurisdictions have applied U.S. law to territories under U.S. control but outside the
United States).
155. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636–37 (1952).
156. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 577, 631–32 (2006).
157. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261–62.
158. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror”, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1013, 1015 (2008) (“[M]ost of the U.S. court decisions concerning the ‘war on terror’ have
not directly addressed these substantive rights claims. Instead, the decisions have mostly
been about process: whether particular courts have jurisdiction; whether the proper
branch of government has made the initial determination of policy; whether the proper
procedures have been followed in implementing the policy; whether particular plaintiffs
have standing; whether evidence is protected from discovery by the state secrets privilege;
and so forth.”).
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Jurisdictionally, the Court has applied something very much like
a substantive control test. In ruling that statutory and constitutional
jurisdiction extend to Guanta´namo Bay, the Court has repeatedly159
emphasized160 the complete factual control the United States exer-
cises there. Yet the actual content of the Court’s sovereignty test is still
being developed and might turn on a variety of factors. Notably, the
reasoning and rhetoric of Boumediene suggests a more formal ap-
proach than the European Court of Human Rights. But the actual
Boumediene test and interpretation of the case by lower courts suggest
an approach to jurisdiction that might be indistinguishable from in-
ternational case law.
Explicating the more formal reading, Anthony Colangelo has de-
scribed the Supreme Court as having developed a full de facto sover-
eignty doctrine, which seems to mean that where the political
branches have established their control, then federal court jurisdic-
tion will follow. He writes: “The Court must rely on political branch
determinations establishing complete jurisdiction and control over a
territory; but once the political branches do that, the Court can take
notice of U.S. de facto sovereignty for purposes of its functional ap-
proach to habeas.”161
Colangelo contrasts this approach with what he terms “practical
sovereignty.”162 For example, the United States would generally have
practical control over an overseas American military base, but the host
country and its courts would generally retain sovereignty.163 If Co-
langelo’s analysis is correct, then U.S. courts would not properly assert
jurisdiction over such a base, since the political branches would have
taken care to preserve the sovereignty of the host country, usually via a
status of forces agreement that preserved, for the host country, some
159. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480, 482 (2004) (“By the express terms of its agree-
ments with Cuba, the United States exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control’ over the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and may continue to exercise such control permanently if it
so chooses. . . . Later cases confirmed that the reach of the writ depended not on formal
notions of territorial sovereignty, but rather on the practical question of ‘the exact extent
and nature of the jurisdiction or dominion exercised in fact by the Crown.’” (internal
citations omitted)).
160. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253 (“Accordingly, for purposes of our analysis, we ac-
cept the Government’s position that Cuba, and not the United States, retains de jure sover-
eignty over Guantanamo Bay. As we did in Rasul, however, we take notice of the obvious
and uncontested fact that the United States, by virtue of its complete jurisdiction and con-
trol over the base, maintains de facto sovereignty over this territory.”).
161. Colangelo, supra note 129, at 675.
162. Id. at 625.
163. Id. at 665–66.
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degree of enforceable sovereignty over the American base.164 By con-
trast, a “practical sovereignty” approach would simply look at the
(high) degree of control the U.S. government exercised inside the
base and assert sovereignty on that basis.
Colangelo’s reading is both plausible and carefully reasoned, so it
should not be dismissed as a possibility. However, it takes into account
neither the likely animating concerns behind the Court’s GWOT juris-
prudence, nor the actual test the Supreme Court laid out in
Boumediene. Moreover, the one major GWOT jurisdiction case since
Boumediene—Al Maqaleh v. Gates (“Al Maqaleh”)165—has gone against
Colangelo’s analysis of the former.
To see the flaws in Colangelo’s arguments, it helps to imagine a
situation that directly confronts Boumediene’s jurisdictional holding: if
the Obama Administration transferred a detainee from Guanta´namo
to Bagram Air Base, in Afghanistan, or to another overseas base, for
continued internment and not for release. Under Colangelo’s read-
ing, the detainee would move from a place of de facto sovereignty,
where he enjoyed habeas rights, to a place of “incomplete jurisdic-
tion” where courts could not properly exercise their power.166 Yet
such an approach would disregard the human rights concerns that
seem to underlie Hamdan, as well as the separation of powers con-
cerns expressed in Boumediene. In the 2006 case, the majority and con-
curring Justices concerned themselves with the human rights of the
detainees, as they extended CA3 rights to the detainees.167 The Court
also expressed more general frustration with the treatment the detain-
ees had received. It wrote:
The absence of any showing of impracticability [in not following
standard court-martial procedures] is particularly disturbing when
considered in light of the clear and admitted failure to apply one
of the most fundamental protections afforded not just by the Man-
ual for Courts-Martial but also by the UCMJ itself: the right to be
present. . . . Whether or not that departure technically is “contrary
164. Id. at 664–67.
165. 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009).
166. Colangelo, supra note 129, at 667–68 (“Based on the foregoing evaluation of U.S.
jurisdiction over Guantanamo and the jurisdictional frameworks created by SOFAs cover-
ing other military installations abroad, the United States does not have complete jurisdic-
tion over either Afghanistan or Iraq. Consequently, the United States does not have de
facto sovereignty over territory in either of these countries, including military bases. Thus,
if the Court continues to use the jurisdictional aspect of de facto sovereignty to inform the
constitutional scope of habeas, as it did in Boumediene, noncitizen government-designated
enemy combatants detained in Afghanistan and Iraq likely will not constitutionally have
access to the writ.”).
167. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006).
634 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
to or inconsistent with” the terms of the UCMJ, . . . the jettisoning
of so basic a right cannot lightly be excused as “practicable.”168
It also suggested that international human rights instruments
might apply to the detainees,169 although the federal courts have not
yet developed this line of reasoning.
Boumediene confirmed such a concern, as it forced the Executive
into a legally and historically novel policy—habeas rights for those in-
terred as an incident of war—in the face of overwhelming political
branch opposition.170 Such a development is explained by concern
for the detainees. The Court also, with much the same frustration, re-
asserted the role of the judicial branch. As the majority wrote:
Abstaining from questions involving formal sovereignty and territo-
rial governance is one thing. To hold the political branches have
the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will is quite an-
other. The former position reflects this Court’s recognition that
certain matters requiring political judgments are best left to the
political branches. The latter would permit a striking anomaly in
our tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in which
Congress and the President, not this Court, say “what the law is.”171
Colangelo’s analysis, and especially his analysis of jurisdiction in
Afghanistan, does not pay attention to such underlying concerns. In
his account, the Court’s jurisdictional analyses seem divorced from
worries over human rights or executive power, when both the cases
themselves, and the development of the jurisprudence from one case
to the next, reinforce these concerns. Such factors point toward the
more flexible, less formal “practical sovereignty” doctrine that Co-
langelo eschews172 or the “effective control” doctrine of the European
Court of Human Rights.173
The most prominent case applying Boumediene’s jurisdictional
framework reinforces this reading. In Al Maqaleh, Judge Thomas Bates
of the District Court of the District of Columbia held that Boumediene
extended habeas rights to international detainees at the facility at
Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan.174 Judge Gates noted that, practically
speaking, there was not much difference in the high degree of control
the United States exercised over both Bagram and Guanta´namo,175
168. Id. at 624 (internal citations omitted).
169. Id. at 633 n.66.
170. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
171. Id. at 2259 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
172. Colangelo, supra note 129, at 670–74.
173. See supra Part I.
174. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009).
175. Id.; see also id. at 223 (“But the differences in control and jurisdiction set forth
above [between Guanta´namo and Bagram] do not significantly reduce the ‘objective de-
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plus the profiles of the detainees seemed identical.176 Moreover,
Judge Bates explained that refusing to extend habeas rights to Bagram
would ignore the concerns over executive power and separation of
powers that were the background of Boumediene.177
Thus, Judge Bates interpreted Boumediene as overwhelmingly fo-
cused on a practical or effective analysis, with a special concern to
limit executive overreach. This interpretation puts Boumediene
squarely in line with international jurisprudence. It also should, pre-
sumptively, extend habeas rights to all GWOT detainees, meaning this
anti-terrorist activity has been put under a framework that is fairly new
and unprecedented in U.S. law, but much more familiar internation-
ally. It is also consistent with—indeed exemplary of—legal cosmopoli-
tanism’s practical concerns of expanding jurisdiction and limiting
executive power, as well as the overarching goal of expanding the de-
mos to include all those subject to state power.
B. New (Law of War) Regulation in the Lower Courts
This area of law began its current development with Boumediene,
which extended constitutional habeas rights to Guanta´namo detain-
ees. The Court did not, however, promulgate the standards or guide-
lines under which such rights would apply.178 Instead, the U.S.
Supreme Court explicitly left this task to the lower courts, and ulti-
mately the district courts in Washington, D.C. and the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals.179 Although the D.C. Circuit has issued a number of
important GWOT decisions, it has yet to issue a definitive statement
on Guanta´namo habeas after Boumediene. Thus, this area of law cur-
rently consists of a number of district court opinions, some of which
have become influential.
gree of control’ the United States has at Bagram. The existence of a SOFA and the pres-
ence of non-U.S. personnel does not affect the actual control the United States exercises at
the Bagram detention facility, which is practically absolute.”).
176. Id. at 209.
177. Id. at 216 n.7 (“This Court’s concern with the unrestrained power of respondent
(i.e., the Executive Branch) to determine the availability of habeas corpus simply by choos-
ing to send a detainee to Bagram rather than Guantanamo is precisely the concern that
animated the Supreme Court’s separation-of-powers observations in Boumediene.”).
178. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008) (“It bears repeating that our
opinion does not address the content of the law that governs petitioners’ detention.”).
179. Id. at 2276. The Supreme Court consolidated Guanta´namo habeas cases in these
courts, but prior to Boumediene some habeas cases were already moving through the Fourth
Circuit and the Eastern District of Virginia. See, e.g., al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213
(4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) vacated sub nom al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (mem).
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The most important of these cases address what authority the
President must assert to defeat a detainee’s habeas suit. The lower
courts have converged on the following answer based on the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s reasoning in Hamdi:180 the President gains his author-
ity to detain from the Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(“AUMF”)181 that followed the 9/11 attacks; and the AUMF itself
grants the President authority to detain persons only according to the
law of war.182 Finally—and, here, the lower courts split slightly—
under the law of war, the President can detain either those directly
engaged in combat with the United States183 or those substantially
supporting the combatants directly engaged in combat with the
United States.184
There have been approximately forty detainee habeas deci-
sions.185 Among these decisions, Hamlily v. Obama (“Hamlily”)186 and
Gherebi v. Obama (“Gherebi”)187 have been the most influential. Both
support the President’s power to detain under the AUMF and the ap-
plication of a restrictive Law of Armed Conflict (“LoAC”) standard.188
They differ, however, on whether the President can detain a person
who has only given “substantial support” to the armed forces of al-
Qaeda or the Taliban (Gherebi189), or whether the detainee must have
180. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (“[I]t is of no moment that the
AUMF does not use specific language of detention. Because detention to prevent a com-
batant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the
use of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’ Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized
detention in the narrow circumstances considered here.”); id. at 521 (“The United States
may detain, for the duration of these hostilities, individuals legitimately determined to be
Taliban combatants who [have] ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United
States.’”).
181. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(explaining that the President is authorized to use “all necessary and appropriate force”)
[hereinafter AUMF].
182. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518–21; Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 55 (D.D.C.
2009); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 72 (D.D.C. 2009).
183. Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
184. Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
185. See Chisun Lee, An Examination of 41 Gitmo Detainee Lawsuits, PROPUBLICA, July 22,
2009, updated Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.propublica.org/special/an-examination-of-31-
gitmo-detainee-lawsuits-722; Chisun Lee, Their Own Private Guanta´namo, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,
2009, at A31, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/opinion/23lee.html.
186. 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009).
187. 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009).
188. Id. at 55; Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 72.
189. Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 54.
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actually been a member of those armed forces or their analogical
equivalent (Hamlily190).
Although the two cases differ on this point, they substantially
agree on most of the analysis behind it. Thus, since Gherebi was the
earlier case and is cited respectfully in Hamlily,191 an analysis of it
yields insight into both cases, as well as the cases that cite both.192
Gherebi begins, analytically, with a construction of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Hamdi, which held the President could detain a
U.S. citizen in the United States under the AUMF.193 The Hamdi
Court reasoned that, since the AUMF authorized the targeting of en-
emy combatants, it also authorized their detention—so long as that
detention conformed to the law of war.194 The Court did not, how-
ever, spend much time on LoAC, except to note the President could
clearly detain Hamdi under that body of law.195 The Court also took
pains to note the Constitution afforded Hamdi due process rights in
detention.196 The Court’s decision seemed to rest on a classic citizen/
non-citizen distinction, as well as a territorial one. In the Court’s
GWOT precedent, Hamdi remains the only case to rely on a due pro-
cess rationale.
The Gherebi court, however, did not make such a citizen/non- dis-
tinction and ruled the President could only detain under the AUMF
in accordance with LoAC197 and held the law of war authorized only
the detention of members of the enemy’s armed forces engaged in
combat with the United States or those substantially supporting such
forces.198 Without the first qualification, the President could poten-
tially detain al-Qaeda members captured in the United States at Guan-
ta´namo as enemy combatants—a ruling that would be in tension with
190. Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (“Although this Court concurs in much of the
reasoning and conclusions of Gherebi, it does not agree with the decision to adopt the
government’s framework in its entirety. Specifically, the Court rejects the concept of ‘sub-
stantial support’ as an independent means for detention. Likewise, the Court finds that
‘directly suspecting[ing] hostilities’ is not a proper basis for detention.”).
191. Id. at 76.
192. See Mattan v. Obama, 618 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Mutairi v. United
States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78, 85 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Odah v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6
(D.D.C. 2009); Al Rabiah v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C. 2009).
193. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 508 (2004).
194. Id. at 554 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, concurring in
judgment).
195. Id. at 515–18, 521.
196. Id. at 537–39.
197. Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2009).
198. Id. at 52–53, 70–71.
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both Hamdi’s grant of due process rights199 and with lower court rul-
ings that address the question directly. The Hamlily court adopted the
above reasoning—except that which allowed the detention of those
“substantially supporting” enemies designated under the AUMF. Gher-
ebi used a combat-based rationale to justify its conclusions. That is,
when engaged in combat against an enemy force, the government
could detain not only those directly participating in hostilities, but
also those somehow part of the “command structure” of the opposing
force.200 It is not entirely clear how the Hamlily standard—rejecting
“substantial support”201—will differ in practice (under either stan-
dard, the government has proven likely to lose.)202
Two reasons for this restrictive standard stand out. First, the dis-
trict courts have used Hamdi to limit distinctions between citizen and
non-citizen detainees. It is not entirely clear how much the U.S. Su-
preme Court, in Hamdi, relied on a citizen, non-citizen distinction—
but it clearly did to some extent203
On one hand, Boumediene erased any such distinction by ex-
tending part of the Constitution to non-citizens at Guanta´namo
Bay.204 On the other hand, by its own terms, Hamdi applies to those
detained in the United States and extends them due process rights;205
while Boumediene applies to detainees held in Guanta´namo and ex-
tends them habeas rights.206 By applying Hamdi in Guanta´namo cases,
the district courts have begun extending due process rights to Guanta´-
namo, which the U.S. Supreme Court has obviously not done, and
which the development of a Guanta´namo habeas standard does not
require. That is, the district courts have demanded a very high degree
of proof from the government207 and impose a high evidentiary stan-
199. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 553.
200. Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (“[T]he Court interprets the government’s ‘substan-
tial support’ standard to mean individuals who were members of the ‘armed forces’ of an
enemy organization at the time of their initial detention. It is not meant to encompass
individuals outside the military command structure of an enemy organization . . . .”).
201. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 70 (D.D.C. 2009).
202. See Lee, supra note 185 (noting the United States has lost approximately eighty
percent of Guanta´namo habeas cases).
203. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537 (“Because we conclude that due process demands some
system for a citizen–detainee to refute his classification, the proposed ‘some evidence’ stan-
dard is inadequate.”).
204. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2261 (2008).
205. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 515–17.
206. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261.
207. See, e.g., Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78, 82 (D.D.C. 2009) (peti-
tioner ordered released even though the district court recognized his conduct was “consis-
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dard208—perhaps higher than the U.S. Supreme Court intended.209
The district courts have collapsed any distinction, in terms of the pro-
cedures regarded as adequate, between habeas cases against Guanta´-
namo detainees and other habeas cases. The district courts have not
done anything clearly wrong, i.e., U.S. Supreme Court precedent does
not foreclose the result they have reached,210 but they have moved
toward a single legal standard for detainees in both the United States
and abroad when they were not required to do so.
The district courts have also interpreted the law of war to severely
limit the discretion of the detaining power in favor of an expanded
judicial role. To wit, the Gherebi court reasoned that LoAC gives au-
thority to detain either members of the enemy’s armed forces; or, if
the enemy does not have armed forces per se, such as al-Qaeda, those
enemies engaged in combat against the United States.211 However,
neither U.S. Supreme Court precedent nor international law compels
this reasoning. First, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued no guidance
on whom the Executive may detain in the first instance212 and has
issued only very limited guidance on the standards that lower courts
should apply in evaluating detainee habeas claims.213
Moreover, the district courts have applied a far more restrictive
version of LoAC than needed in holding the Executive could only de-
tain members of the armed forces of the enemy or those actively en-
gaged in combat against the United States. In reaching this
conclusion, the courts have relied, oddly, on the law of targeting: the
AUMF authorizes the President to target certain persons, pursuant to
tent with” an al-Qaeda member, and petitioner had not offered a plausible alternative
version of events).
208. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533–44 (suggesting permissibility of the government using
both hearsay evidence and a presumption of evidentiary validity to justify detention). But
see Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 849 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (hearsay may only be used to justify
detention if the hearsay comes with significant indications of reliability); Bismullah v.
Gates, 501 F.3d 178, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (putting significant preconditions on the use of a
presumption of validity). See also Al Mutairi, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78; Al Odah v. United States,
648 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Rabiah v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 (D.D.C.
2009) (disallowing a presumption in favor of the government’s evidence).
209. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533–34.
210. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229.
211. Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 68 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[T]errorist organiza-
tions do have leadership and command structures, however diffuse, and persons who re-
ceive and execute orders within this command structure are analogous to combatants . . . .”
(citing Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2048, 2114–15 (2005))).
212. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229.
213. Id.
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the law of war; if the President can target a person, then logically the
President can also choose to detain that person.214 Under most read-
ings of the law of war, military forces may detain some persons whom
they may not usually otherwise target. In particular, armed forces may
only target members of the enemy’s armed forces, or civilians directly
participating in hostilities. However, those same armed forces may de-
tain members of the enemy’s armed forces, civilians directly partici-
pating in hostilities, and civilians believed to pose a security threat.215
And, if the U.S. detentions are categorized not as part of combat oper-
ations, but as part of a military occupation, then the authority to de-
tain is even broader.
The Australian counter-insurgency expert Lt. Col. David Kilcul-
len, an adviser to Gen. David Petraeus, has characterized the entire
GWOT this way, i.e. a “global counterinsurgency.”216 This line of
thought puts the United States in the place of an occupying power,
and so the United States ought to benefit from the detention stan-
dards and quasi-police powers applicable in occupation.217 Moreover,
214. See, e.g., Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 70–71.
215. See Geneva Convention IV Protection of Civilian Persons, supra note 91, art. 5
(“Where, in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied that an individual
protected person [i.e., civilian noncombatant] is definitely suspected of or engaged in ac-
tivities hostile to the security of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to
claim such rights and privilege under the present Convention as would, if exercised in the
favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of the State.”); id. art. 42
(“The internment or placing in assigned residence of protected persons may be ordered
only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.”); ICRC, PROTEC-
TION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS, supra note 4, at 257 (“It did not seem possible to define the
expression ‘security of the State’ in a more concrete fashion. It is thus left very largely to
Governments to decide the measure of activity prejudicial to the internal or external secur-
ity of the State which justifies internment or assigned residence.”).
216. Lt. Col. David Kilcullen, Countering Global Insurgency, SMALL WARS JOURNAL, Nov.
20, 2004, at 20, 45, available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf; see
also Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, The War on Terror, and the Laws of War, 95 VA. L.
REV. 1745 (2009).
217. See, e.g., United States v. List, reprinted in TRIALS OF THE WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, Vol. XI., at 1244–45 (1953), available at http://www.loc.
gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-XI.pdf (“The status of an occupant
of the territory of the enemy having been achieved, international law places the responsi-
bility upon the commanding general of preserving order, punishing crime, and protecting
lives and property within the occupied territory. His power in accomplishing these ends is
as great as his responsibility.”); Geneva Convention IV Protection of Civilian Persons, supra
note 91, at arts. 50, 55, 56, 58–62 (occupying power has the duty to provide education;
foodstuffs and medical supplies to the civilian population; maintain medical and hospital
facilities; distribute books and required articles for religious needs; and facilitate relief
efforts); id. art. 5 (“Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained
as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the secur-
ity of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military secur-
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many of those detained at Guanta´namo and Bagram, and who now
benefit from habeas rights, are foreign fighters captured in the Af-
ghan theater. Thus, even under a traditional understanding of “occu-
pation,” the United States would enjoy more discretion to detain such
people than it has currently.218 Which is to say, in such cases the occu-
pying power may detain almost any person it perceives as a security
threat, so long as it gives such persons recourse to a hearing in a mili-
tary tribunal.219 Reviewing detentions, therefore, by applying the law
of targeting in an CA3 domestic court, is an anomalous construction
of international law for at least two reasons: first, it applies a more
restrictive standard regarding whom may be detained than interna-
tional law requires; and, second, it does so in a tribunal that offers
more process than international law says is needed.220
Thus, the district courts have construed the Hamdi and
Boumediene decisions to erase much of the previous distinction in the
legal standards that apply to domestic and foreign detainees. By a rela-
tively narrow reading of the cases, Hamdi addresses when domestic
persons may be detained,221 while other cases such as Munaf v. Geren
(“Munaf”),222 that provide the Executive with much greater discre-
tion, govern foreign detentions. District courts, however, have gener-
ally overlooked Munaf in order to apply Hamdi directly to foreign
detainees.223 And, with the same foreign detainees, the district courts
have developed and applied a legal standard that severely limits the
Executive’s discretion. In construing the AUMF, these courts have rea-
soned that it only authorizes the Executive to detain persons whom
the Executive could detain under the law of war. The courts have then
ity so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication under the present
Convention.”); id. arts. 41–43, 66, 68, 78 (providing for the internment of protected per-
sons); id. arts. 64, 66 (An occupying power may, with limitations, promulgate new penal
laws in occupied territory, and try residents of that territory in military courts, “on [the]
condition that the said courts sit in the occupied country.”); id. art. 66. Thus, courts sitting
in the United States are least excessively protective of the rights of persons under occupa-
tion. Id. art. 64.
218. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
219. Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2220–27 (2008).
220. See id.
221. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 504, 533 (2004).
222. Id. at 2219 (persons detained in Iraq as part of the Iraq conflict do not enjoy
access to CA3 courts).
223. See, e.g., Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009); Hamlily v. Obama,
616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009); Mattan v. Obama, 618 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2009);
Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78, 85 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Odah v. United States,
648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Rabiah v. United States, 659 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17
(D.D.C. 2009).
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developed a reading of the law of war, so narrow as to be inconsistent
with those laws usual construal.224
The net result has been to flatten domestic and foreign legal stan-
dards, while limiting the discretion of the Executive. Such develop-
ments fit with the theory of legal cosmopolitanism. Like legal
cosmopolitanism, these developments extend previously domestic le-
gal standards to foreign persons. But, unlike legal cosmopolitanism as
such, these district court cases do not shift power from the Executive
to the courts. Rather, Boumediene had already accomplished this shift
in power. However, the legal standard these courts developed does
limit those persons whom the Executive may detain, based upon an
aggressive reading of the law of war. Thus, although these cases do not
entirely fit the theory of legal cosmopolitanism, they match it substan-
tially, while evincing many of the same concerns.
C. New Regulation in the Political Branches
The political branches have focused their regulatory efforts on
two areas: interrogation and targeting. Interrogation presents the
most straightforward application of IHL to intelligence, while the law
around targeting, although less developed, still displays cosmopolitan
tendencies. The common impulse behind recent developments—to
extend to GWOT detainees the same protections full prisoners of war
receive and to regulate the targeting of terrorists under the law of
war—seems cosmopolitan because of its concern for a group of non-
resident aliens, many of whom are avowed enemies of the United
States. However, this extension of rights comes from the Executive
Branch voluntarily and so might represent the Executive protecting
his sphere of influence and preempting a formal extension of rights.
Nevertheless, the impulse behind President Obama’s extension of
rights to alleged GWOT enemies and the support for that extension
among some substantial portion of the electorate seem clear enough
and therefore represent a cosmopolitanism of a kind closer to Robert
Dahl’s philosophical concerns225 and relatively further from the more
lawyerly concerns of Cass Sunstein or John Ely that emphasize the im-
portance of courts.226 To the extent the Executive is responding to
224. See, e.g., Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43; Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63; Mattan, 618 F.
Supp. 2d at 26; Al Mutairi, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 85; Al Odah, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 6; Al Rabiah,
659 F. Supp. 2d at 17.
225. DAHL, supra note 14, at 120–24, 320–21.
226. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 142–43 (1994); ELY, supra note 19,
at 101–02.
Winter 2010] LEGAL COSMOPOLITANISM & INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 643
popular pressure on interrogation and targeting, these developments
could be a sign the popular demos has already expanded, and the
Executive is playing a game of catch-up.
Hamdan mandated the United States treat all detainees at Guan-
ta´namo according to CA3.227 After Hamdan, the Bush Administration
decided, as an informal policy, to close CIA “black sites,”228 secret pris-
ons located outside the United States which allegedly held high-value
detainees, including those directly involved in the 9/11 attacks.229 As
a result, Guanta´namo would have contained a significant number of
intelligence detainees whom, because of Hamdan, could only be inter-
rogated by intelligence agents according to IHL standards.230 The
Obama Administration has strengthened this policy largely by making
the position official, thereby publicly binding itself in Executive Order
13,491, entitled “Ensuring Lawful Interrogation.”231
Executive Order 13,491 repeals Bush-issued Executive Order
13,440,232 which had brought vastly more CIA activity under the scope
of federal criminal law.233 Executive Order 13,440, although perhaps
227. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006).
228. Peter Baker, Inside Obama’s War on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, (Magazine),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/magazine/17Terror-t.html?hp=&page-
wanted=all (“By the time Obama was inaugurated, . . . Bush had ordered that the secret
C.I.A. black site prisons be emptied.”).
229. See Jane Mayer, The Black Sites: A Rare Look Inside the C.I.A.’s Secret Interrogation Pro-
gram, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2007, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2007/08/13/070813fa_fact_mayer.
230. See generally Tim Golden & Eric Schmitt, A Growing Afghan Prison Rivals Bleak Guan-
tanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/26/inter-
national/26bagram.html?_r=1&sq=closing%20black%20sites&st=nyt&scp=2&pagewanted=
all) (stating that after the Supreme Court granted CA3 rights to Guanta´namo detainees,
the Bush Administration started to send detainees to other sites, which were less protective
of detainee rights).
231. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009).
232. Exec. Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40707 (July 20, 2007).
233. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d) (2006) (establishing violations of CA3 as violations of the War
Crimes Act). As originally enacted, the War Crimes Act of 1996 prohibited activities like
torture, kidnapping and other grave breaches of the Geneva and Hague Conventions—
meaning that it prohibited these activities only in an international armed conflict—and,
thus, prohibited neither of these activities in a non-international armed conflict. Id. § 2441.
Therefore, the original War Crimes Act did not prohibit these activities in either conflicts
like those with al-Qaeda mentioned in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006), or
other common CIA IHL violations, such as wearing civilian clothing during combat. See
Parks, supra note 117, at 518 (noting that even the perfidious wearing of civilian clothing is
not a grave breach). Regardless, even though the 2006 amendments to the War Crimes Act
greatly expanded its reach—particularly with regard to the GWOT—the Act still does not
reach jus ad bellum violations, activities outside of any armed conflict, or, as above, law of
war violations that are not grave breaches. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d) (2006); Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-377, 129 Stat. 2600.
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deliberately vague, seemed to shield the CIA from prosecution for
CA3 violations by retroactively declaring that CIA detention and inter-
rogation programs met CA3,234 and by giving authority to the Director
of Central Intelligence to determine CA3 standards.235 By contrast,
President Obama’s Executive Order 13,491 has both ordered the CIA
to close all remaining detention centers236 and mandated that the CIA
follow CA3 standards in all interrogations “in any armed conflict,”237
presumably including the GWOT.238 President Obama’s Executive Or-
der neither claims interpretive authority for itself, nor assigns inter-
pretive authority to the intelligence bureaucracy. At the very least,
such disclaiming of interpretive authority moves that authority else-
where in the Executive Branch, for instance to the Department of Jus-
tice. The disclaimer also removes at least two obstacles in the way of
courts interpreting CA3. First, if CIA officers or other interrogators
had relied in good faith on executive interpretations of CA3, that
would have raised at least an equitable argument against their subse-
quent prosecution for violating CA3 standards.239 Second, the dis-
claimer would have preemptively eschewed the Executive attempting
to bar courts, under a version of the political question doctrine, from
issuing conflicting interpretations of CA3.240 Not only does the
Obama Executive Order apply IHL standards to most CIA activities, it
234. Exec. Order No. 13,440, supra note 232, § 3(b).
235. Id. § 3(c).
236. Exec. Order. No. 13,491, supra note 231, § 4(a).
237. Id. § 3(a).
238. See Mike Allen, CIA Chief Vows to Treat Congress Better, POLITICO.COM, Feb. 25, 2009,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0209/19342.html (reporting, inter alia, that CIA
Director Leon Panetta has stated, in relationship to the fight against terrorists, that “there
is no question this is a war”).
239. See Peter Baker, David Johnston & Mark Mazzetti, Abuse Issue Puts the C.I.A. and
Justice Dept. at Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
08/28/us/politics/28intel.html.
240. See, e.g., Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973), aff’d in mem Atlee v. Laird, 347
F. Supp. 689, 692, 701, 710 (E.D. Pa., 1972) (dismissing a challenge to U.S.’s actions in
Vietnam on political question grounds). To the extent that ‘how to interrogate’ constitutes
a question on how to fight a war, one can argue the Constitution assigns this duty to sole
Executive discretion. See also Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional
Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 214 (2006)
(“Academics may continue to debate whether the President or Congress should decide
whether to begin war, but once war has begun, our constitutional system has usually been
content to allow the President as Commander-in-Chief to decide the best strategies and
tactics to defeat the enemy.”). But see David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Com-
mander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding,
121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 693 (2008) (“[E]ven when hostilities are underway, the Com-
mander in Chief often operates in a legal environment instinct with legislatively imposed
limitations.”).
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also provides for judicial interpretation and supervision of those stan-
dards. Thus, IHL standards now apply to the great majority of intelli-
gence interrogations, wherever conducted, including the most
politically sensitive interrogations of accused terrorists.
A similar pattern of executive action applies to the emerging law
of terrorist targeting—although, here, the Executive has so far been
less responsive to cosmopolitan pressures. Thus far the controversy
has been over the government’s targeting of al-Qaeda members
outside the war zones in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly in Pakistan
and South Arabia.241 The government has not offered a clear legal
justification for its actions. However, defenders of the targeting pro-
gram, such as Kenneth Anderson242 and Eric Posner,243 have sought
to legally ground the program primarily in the post-9/11 AUMF.244
They have offered this rationale even though both international law
and the U.S. Constitution arguably provide independent justification
for the controversial targeting.
The targeting controversy began as early as 2002 with the target-
ing of al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen.245 Yet, it reached a head only
recently with related controversies over both targeting al-Qaeda mem-
241. See Robert Birsel, U.S. Missile Kills 13 in Pakistan, REUTERS, Apr 4, 2009, http://
www.reuters.com/article/idUSISL40275420090404; Karen DeYoung & Joby Warrick, Drone
Attacks Inside Pakistan Will Continue, CIA Chief Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2009, at A10;
Golden & Schmitt, supra note 230; Mayer, supra note 229; Mark Mazzetti & David E.
Sanger, Obama Expands Missile Strikes Inside Pakistan, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at A1; Jane
Perlez, Pakistan Rehearses Its Two-Step on Airstrikes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, at A10; David E.
Sanger & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Weighs Taliban Strike into Pakistan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2009, at
A1; Eric Schmitt & Christopher Drew, More Drone Attacks in Pakistan Planned, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2009, at A15; Pir Zubair Shah, Missile Strike Kills 4 in Pakistan, N.Y Times, Mar. 17,
2009; Pir Zubair Shah & Alan Cowell, Missile Strike Said to Kill 10 in Pakistan, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 1, 2009, at A10; Jay Solomon, Siobhan Gorman & Matthew Rosenberg, U.S. Plans New
Drone Attacks in Pakistan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2009; Nahal Toosi, Suspected U.S. Missile Kills
3 in Northwest Pakistan, ASSOC’D PRESS, Apr. 8, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Interna-
tional/wireStory?id=7285265.
242. Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law 8–27
(Brookings Institution, Working Paper, 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0511_counterterrorism_anderson/0511_counterterrorism_
anderson.pdf; see also Nathan A. Sales, Targeted Killings: Slaying al-Qaeda Leaders Is Good Policy
that Stands on Firm Legal Ground, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Aug. 20, 2009, http://article.national
review.com/?q=MGZhNWIzNjdjN2ZhNWE5YzBlMWQ3YjIwMDFhZThiMTU.
243. Eric Posner, Does Obama Have Authority to Order Military Strikes in Yemen?, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 30, 2009, 1:09 PM), http://volokh.com/2009/12/30/does-
obama-have-authority-to-order-military-strikes-in-yemen.
244. AUMF, supra note 181.
245. See, e.g., CIA Yemen Operation: Many See ‘Assassination without Jury, Judge,’ GLOBAL-
SECURITY.ORG, Nov. 18, 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/news/2002/in-
tell-021118-wwwh21118.htm (collecting news stories on, and editorials criticizing, the CIA’s
2002 targeting of al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen).
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bers in Pakistan and elsewhere with Predator drones246 and a never-
culminated CIA plan to assassinate senior al-Qaeda leaders.247 These
controversies centered on allegations of executive lawlessness and
overreach,248 including charges that the program amounts to “politi-
cal assassination,” in violation of Executive Order 12,333249 (although,
given how narrowly “assassination” is defined in U.S. law, this seems
unlikely250).
These allegations are commonly justified based on restrictive
readings of both the AUMF and law of war and a disregard of the
more expansive assertions of mainstream authority. The program’s
defenders have stated—or even conceded—that it derived authority
to target al-Qaeda leaders from the AUMF.251 While the AUMF pro-
vides such authority,252 so do other sources. The Executive could have
proceeded with an argument based on the Executive’s traditional
246. Birsel, supra note 241; DeYoung & Warrick, supra note 241, at A10; Mazzetti &
Sanger, supra note 241, at A1; Perlez, supra note 241, at A10; Sanger & Schmitt, supra note
241, at A1; Schmitt & Drew, supra note 241, at A15; Shah, supra note 241; Shah & Cowell,
supra note 241, at A10; Solomon, Gorman & Rosenberg, supra note 241, at A1; Toosi, supra
note 241.
247. See, e.g., Paul Kane & Joby Warrick, House Panel to Investigate Canceled CIA Program,
WASH. POST, July 18, 2009, at A3.
248. See, e.g., John Cole, From the Shit You Already Knew Department, BALLOON JUICE (Jul.
11, 2009), http://www.balloon-juice.com/?p=23936 (characterizing the actions of the
Bush Administration, in targeting al-Qaeda leaders without informing Congress, to be part
of a pattern of rampant criminality); Jonathan Turley, Report: Cheney Ordered Concealment of
Secret Program from Congress, JONATHAN TURLEY: RES IPSA LOQUITUR (“THE THING ITSELF
SPEAKS”) (Jul. 12, 2009), http://jonathanturley.org/2009/07/12/report-cheney-ordered-
concealment-of-secret-program-from-congress) (“Once again, it is astonishing that Attor-
ney General Eric Holder continues to refuse to appoint a special prosecutor to deal with
the mounting allegations of criminal acts by the Bush Administration. The blocking of
such investigations by the Obama Administration reaffirms the view that our intelligence
services live beyond the reach of the law and that our leaders are unaccountable under the
criminal laws that they apply to average citizens.”).
249. Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 49, § 2.11.
250. Anderson, supra note 242, at 24–25 (noting a multitude of official and unofficial
interpretations from both the President and Congress favoring a very narrow definition of
“investment,” centered around the murder of foreign political leaders, in a manner that
would violate United States law). President Reagan, for example, felt sufficiently uncon-
strained by the ban to lob cruise missiles at President Qadaffi of Libya. See Seymour Hersh,
Target Qadafi, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1987, § 6 (Magazine). But see Mary Ellen O’Connell, To
Kill or Capture Suspects in the Global War on Terror, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 325, 331 (2003)
(arguing that targeted killing is both illegal and bad policy); Gary Solis, Targeted Killing and
the Law of Armed Conflict, 60 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 127, 129, 132–33 (2007) (arguing that
targeted killing outside an armed conflict is illegal assassination, i.e. murder).
251. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 242; Posner, supra note 243; see also AUMF, supra
note 181.
252. AUMF, supra 181, § 2(a), reprinted at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006) (authorizing the
President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
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practices and prerogatives. In particular, the National Security Act of
1947 gives the CIA the authority to conduct covert military opera-
tions.253 Historically, such operations were understood to fall outside
traditional notions of armed conflict and beyond the reach of the law
of war.254 And, just as importantly, Congress has repeatedly acqui-
esced in the CIA’s engaging in such activities.255 Thus, such activi-
ties—outside the law of war, but well within historical tradition—
would fall into Youngstown category one or two,256 as well as receive
support from other authoritative precedent, such as Dames & Moore v.
Regan.257
In other words, in conducting overseas targeting of al-Qaeda
leaders, the President arguably enjoys statutory support, historical sup-
port, and precedential support. Yet both President Bush and Presi-
dent Obama have sought support elsewhere: in more recent, and
narrow, congressional authorization and the law of war.258 Relying on
these sources promises to, in the future, severely restrict executive ac-
tion based upon a perceived need for congressional authorization
(though Anderson has argued with some force that the President
needs to clarify the legal regime that governs targeted killing, even if
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
[of September 11]”).
253. 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(5) (2006) (authorizing the CIA to undertake “additional ser-
vices of common concern” and “such other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security as the President or the National Security Council may di-
rect”); Anderson, supra note 242, at 21 (relying on the work of Philip Trimble and stating
that, “[d]uring the 1960s, for example, these included assistance to overthrow govern-
ments in Iran and Guatemala; assistance in attempts to ‘assassinate leaders in Cuba, Chile,
and Zaire;’ support for ‘civil wars in Iraq and Laos;’ and an ‘invasion of Cuba’”).
254. See supra Parts II.A., II.C.
255. Cole, supra note 248; TURLEY, supra note 248.
256. Youngstown Tube & Sheet Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636–38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
257. 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (reasoning that because Congress had acquiesced repeatedly
to a certain sort of executive action, the executive gained authority to undertake that ac-
tion without congressional approval).
258. See, e.g., AUMF, supra note 181, § 2(a); United States v. List, reprinted in TRIALS OF
THE WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, Vol. XI., at 1244–45
(1953), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-
XI.pdf (“The status of an occupant of the territory of the enemy having been achieved,
international law places the responsibility upon the commanding general of preserving
order, punishing crime, and protecting lives and property within the occupied territory.
His power in accomplishing these ends is as great as his responsibility.”); Geneva Conven-
tion IV Protection of Civilian Persons, supra note 91, art. 66 (An occupying power may,
with limitations, promulgate new penal laws in occupied territory, and try residents of that
territory in military courts, “on [the] condition that the said courts sit in the occupied
country.”).
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that regime might be fairly restrictive259). Putting aside any debates
over legal strategy, such reliance on the AUMF shows an attitude to-
ward the law and its subjects that is different from the attitude prior
Presidents had evinced.
The CIA, and its predecessor OSS, has played a significant role in
every conflict since World War II, including paramilitary operations.
Yet, international law did not apply to it in any significant way, and,
more importantly, the CIA never understood itself as being bound by
international law.260 Thus, it conducted illegal operations in Laos and
Cambodia; developed interrogation guidelines without regard to ei-
ther IHL, human rights law, or even the jus cogens prohibition on tor-
ture; and spoke of its activities quite openly.261 Moreover, while the
CIA has, since the 1970s, worked under significant restrictions,262
these restrictions have until recently applied only within the tradi-
tional demos: to citizens and foreign nationals on American soil, and
to American citizens abroad.263
The courts have extended the right to challenge detention to
Guanta´namo,264 and now potentially to Bagram.265 Moreover, Presi-
dent Obama has ensured that CA3 protects all GWOT detainees, no
matter where held.266 Both of these changes were aimed directly at
CIA activity and the proponents of that activity in the Bush Adminis-
tration.267 The demos has been extended to cover foreign persons
who, though abroad, are affected adversely by U.S. actions. And, a
combination of binding court decisions and highly public, and so po-
259. Anderson, supra note 242, at 37 (“Many in the world of ideas and policy have
already concluded that targeted killing as a category, even if proffered as self-defense, is
unacceptable and indeed all but per se illegal. If the United States wishes to preserve its
traditional powers and practices in this area, it had better assert them. Else it will find that
as a practical matter they have dissipated through desuetude.”).
260. See supra Part II.C.
261. Id.
262. See supra Part II.A.
263. Id.
264. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004); Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F.
Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009).
265. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209, 223 (D.D.C. 2009).
266. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, supra note 231.
267. See Memorandum from Alberto J. Mora, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of the Navy,
on Statement for the Record: Office of General Counsel Involvement in Interrogation Is-
sues to Inspector Gen., Dep’t of the Navy, July 7, 2004, available at http://www.newyorker.
com/images/pdfs/moramemo.pdf (General Counsel of the Navy expressing extreme
skepticism over the legality of aggressive GWOT techniques).
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litically binding, executive orders has constrained executive action,
while expanding the power of the judiciary.
D. A Counterpoint to Cosmopolitanism: The Jurisprudence of the
D.C. Circuit
Not every U.S. court, most notably the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, which is charged with reviewing all Guan-
ta´namo habeas decisions, has followed a cosmopolitan agenda.268
Rather, the underlying framework of its decisions would seem to be
much closer to that of traditional intelligence law, with presumptions
of, on the one hand, broad executive discretion, and, on the other, a
limited demos (and, concomitantly, role for courts and the use of in-
ternational law).269 Both the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in Al-
Bihani v. United States (“Al-Bihani”)270 and other GWOT decisions re-
flect this framework. Right or wrong, the U.S. Supreme Court has
tended to disagree with the D.C. Circuit in this area and has reversed
in three important cases: Rasul271 (then Al Odah v. United States272),
Hamdan,273 and Boumediene.274
Among these cases, it is Al-Bihani that most clearly reflects the
D.C. Circuit’s assumptions regarding executive power and interna-
tional law, while Boumediene speaks more clearly to the detainees’
place (or lack thereof) in the demos. As to the D.C. Circuit’s jurispru-
dence on executive power and international law, Al-Bihani reasons
IHL does not limit the President’s authority under the AUMF.275 This
removes both the substantive limit on executive power in the GWOT
and the primary means by which the Guanta´namo detainees had chal-
lenged their detention. Indeed, the Court construed executive au-
thority beyond even what the Obama Administration had asked for.276
268. Rasal v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (conferring jurisdiction over all habeas
corpus petitions from Guanta´namo Bay on the District Court for the District of Columbia).
269. See supra Part II.
270. 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
271. Rasul, 542 U.S. 466.
272. 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding, inter alia, that plaintiffs, including Rasul
and Al-Odah, did not enjoy statutory habeas rights), rev’d sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466 (2004).
273. 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding Hamdan’s detention violated neither the
Detainee Treatment Act, CA3, nor any other relevant provision), rev’d Hamdan v. Rum-
sfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
274. 476 F.3d 981 (2007) (holding, inter alia, that Boumediene did not enjoy constitu-
tional habeas rights), rev’d Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
275. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 871–72.
276. Id. at 885 (Williams, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment) (“Curiously,
the majority’s dictum goes well beyond what even the government has argued in this case.”).
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This almost certainly reflects an underlying assumption of vast execu-
tive power in national security matters.
In Al-Bihani, however, the D.C. Circuit spends very little time ana-
lyzing or defending this position, and instead announces its conclu-
sion and dismisses IHL as something U.S. courts cannot implement277
since IHL is likely too vague for reliable application.278 This position
has drawn withering criticism279 and, though the D.C. Circuit’s opin-
ion is too conclusory to be convincing, it is not necessarily wrong if
one starts from domestic law sources and traditional national security
law premises. First, neither other Circuits280 nor the U.S. Supreme
Court281 have treated the Geneva Conventions as self-executing. Sec-
ond, neither Hamdi nor other potentially relevant U.S. Supreme
Court GWOT cases like Hamdan mandate that the President follow
IHL in detentions across the board. Hamdi merely uses IHL to con-
strue the AUMF, and not necessarily to limit executive action;282 while
in Hamdan, the Court, when presented with a chance to apply the
Geneva Conventions directly, did not do so and instead relied on stat-
utory incorporation through the Uniform Code of Military Justice.283
277. Id. at 871 (“The international laws of war as a whole have not been implemented
domestically by Congress and are therefore not a source of authority for U.S. courts.”).
278. Id. (referring to “vague treaty provisions and amorphous customary principles”).
279. See, e.g., Deborah Pearlstein, D.C. Circuit Speaks on Gitmo Habeas Merits, OPINIO
JURIS (Jan. 5, 2010, 1:56 PM EDT), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/01/05/dc-circuit-speaks-
on-gitmo-habeas-merits.
280. To the extent there has been a circuit split in this area, it has been over how to
interpret Hamdi. The Fourth Circuit, in particular, has tended to interpret Hamdi as limit-
ing presidential discretion via IHL, though it still relies on the AUMF to implant IHL into
law citable in court. See al-Marri v. Puciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008). But see In re
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 478–80 (D.D.C. 2005); Hamdan v. Rum-
sfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 165 (D.D.C. 2004), overruled by 548 U.S. 557 (2006); United
States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553–54 (E.D. Va. 2002) (treating provisions of the
Geneva Conventions as self-executing).
281. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
282. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517–24 (2004) (observing the law of war is
helpful in determining the President’s authority under the AUMF); see also Curtis A. Brad-
ley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2047, 2088–2100 (2005) (interpreting Hamdi and the AUMF to mean that the Presi-
dent’s powers are informed, but not limited, by IHL); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations
for the Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293,
305–23 (2005) (criticizing Hamdi for employing international norms in an unclear man-
ner, and suggesting that courts in the future should interpret international norms as a
limit on Presidential action).
283. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 619–25 (treating the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(“UCMJ”) as incorporating CA3 requirements and, indeed, using the UCMJ requirements
to define CA3 requirements).
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More broadly, however, the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning almost cer-
tainly rests on the proposition that Hamdi and the AUMF leave to the
President some authority to violate IHL. Although inimical to most
international law scholars, this position is not really remarkable. As
this Article has demonstrated, the Executive, via the CIA, has regularly
violated IHL when the national interest demanded.284 Indeed, most
paramilitary operations are covered by, but violate, IHL285—yet they
enjoy not only historical but statutory support.286 They have also been
central to the war against al-Qaeda since its inception.287
The extremely broad grant of authority in the AUMF certainly
covers such operations. It also does not mention IHL in any capacity,
for at least one very plausible reason. Since 2001, there has been tre-
mendous judicial and scholarly work on clarifying how IHL applies to
al-Qaeda. But this work did not generally exist at the time of the
AUMF. Thus, if Congress intended the AUMF to be limited by IHL,
that would mean it intended the response to 9/11 to be limited in a
way that was, at the time, completely unpredictable and potentially
quite restrictive. This is just not plausible.
This is not to say that Al-Bihani is necessarily correct. As this Arti-
cle has demonstrated, recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, while not
disallowing the Al-Bihani result, start from a very different set of prem-
ises regarding executive power.288 However, if one presumes the Presi-
dent enjoys vast authority in this area, including the authority to
violate international law;289 and that the Geneva Conventions have
not been incorporated domestically in a relevant way; the Al-Bihani
result flows naturally from the broad language of the AUMF.
These Court decisions also start from a different conception of
the demos. Per John Hart Ely, courts often function to bring into the
284. See supra Part II.C.
285. See supra Parts II.B–C.
286. See, e.g., Paul Kane & Joby Warrick, House Panel to Investigate Canceled CIA Program,
WASH. POST, July 18, 2009, at A03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2009/07/17/AR2009071703232.html?wprss=rss_politics.
287. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276 (2008) (consolidating Guanta´namo
habeas cases to the District Court of the District of Columbia, and the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia); see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of
Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2005); Scott Shane, The Question of Liability Stirs Con-
cern at the CIA, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2006, at A12 available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/09/16/washington/16legal.html.
288. See supra Part III.A.
289. See Roger P. Alford, Foreign Relations as a Matter of Interpretation: The Use and Abuse of
Charming Betsy, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1339, 1363–68 (2006) (arguing that the Charming Betsy
canon of construction reserves for the President authority to violate international law).
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demos groups whom the democratic process leaves outside. They ex-
pand the definition of who “counts” in the political community by
expanding the law’s reach.290 Scholars have made both an observa-
tion-based and normative case for recognizing an expanding demos—
one that less focused on traditional definitions of the national
community.291
In its opinions, however, the D.C. Circuit has limited the law’s
reach to a more traditional conception of the demos. Perhaps the
clearest example of this is the Circuit’s decision in Boumediene.292 As
with the later, contradictory U.S. Supreme Court opinion,293 the pri-
mary question presented was whether constitutional habeas rights ex-
tended to Guanta´namo. Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court used the
occasion to expand the reach of the demos, the D.C. Circuit did not.
The D.C. Circuit court simply stated that constitutional habeas is lim-
ited to the extent of the writ in 1789,294 performed a straightforward
historical analysis, and concluded that because no cases of that era
extended habeas in a situation like the Guanta´namo detainees, habeas
does not reach them now.295 In other words, the D.C. Circuit implic-
itly embraced the demos—the political community within the law’s
protection—as it existed in 1789. What is more, the D.C. Circuit could
have reasoned that, because no Constitution-era precedent addressed
a situation quite like Guanta´namo, the field was open to apply not a
nonexistent controlling precedent, but the principles underlying
habeas. This is essentially what Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion did
in Boumediene.296 The D.C. Circuit did not and, therefore, upheld a
traditional idea of the demos—that the Supreme Court then reversed.
In a string of cases, the D.C. Circuit has limited the reach of
habeas or of international law297—of the demos and of the role of
290. ELY, supra note 19, at 101–02.
291. DAHL, supra note 14, at 121, 318–22.
292. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), overruled by 128 S. Ct. 2229
(2008).
293. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
294. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 987.
295. Id. at 990–91. This is also the approach Justice Scalia took in his dissent in the
Supreme Court opinion. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2293 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
296. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262 (“It is true that before today the Court has never
held that noncitizens detained by our Government in territory over which another country
maintains de jure sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution. But the cases before
us lack any precise historical parallel.”).
297. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 165 (D.D.C. 2004), overruled by
548 U.S. 557 (2006) (rejecting calls to apply the Geneva Conventions (including CA3) to
Guanta´namo reasoning, similar to the court in Boumedience, because the Conventions
might, but do not necessarily apply to an organization like al-Qaeda, courts should defer to
Winter 2010] LEGAL COSMOPOLITANISM & INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 653
courts. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently reversed these deci-
sions, while reasoning from a cosmopolitan basis. Given the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s poor record on appeal, and that it continues to reason in a very
different way from the nation’s highest court, one can reasonably pre-
dict that, if the U.S. Supreme Court grants cert in Al-Bihani, it will
reverse. Of course, this is uncertain on multiple levels, and the D.C.
Circuit could have the last word. But if Al-Bihani remains standing, it
will represent a truly striking instance of anti-cosmopolitanism in
GWOT jurisprudence.
IV. Making Intelligence Comply with the Law of War
The likely future of intelligence law lies in legal cosmopolitanism.
The recent GWOT U.S. Supreme Court cases and legislative and exec-
utive action have done much to import IHL into intelligence opera-
tions, particularly in the core intelligence activities of detention and
interrogation. Based on the experience of other executive agencies
and, in particular, the U.S. military, executive oversight will likely lead
to a great deal of IHL compliance by the CIA.
A. Bureaucratic Change and Bureaucratic Momentum at the CIA
If the CIA is required to partially comply with parts of IHL, his-
tory suggests it will voluntarily comply with more than would seem to
be required—even though the CIA would likely understand itself to
be complying under duress.
Most basically, if law and regulation require the CIA to comply
with even a partial list of law of war guidelines, the CIA, like other
bureaucratic organizations, will embrace some prophylactic measures.
These measures will then empower and incentivize certain people in
the CIA to push compliance further than the original laws or regula-
tions probably intended—or more benignly: the CIA will start to com-
ply because it is forced to, and then further comply because it has
internalized the values of IHL.
Both IHL and domestic legal actors will empower and incentivize
certain people in the CIA to enforce compliance. Indeed, the Army
Field Manual explicitly requires commanders to monitor and enforce
IHL298 and to ensure knowledge of the Geneva Conventions among
the Executive in deciding whether the Conventions do apply); see also Boumediene, 128 S. Ct.
2229.
298. See, e.g., Department of the Army, FM 2-22-3: Human Intelligence Collector Operations,
Sept. 6 2006, at 5-18, http://www.army.mil/institution/armypublicaffairs/pdf/fm2-22-3.
pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2010) (This Field Manual states, “[a]ll persons who have knowl-
654 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
all force members.299 Mutatis mutandis, CIA personnel must also un-
dertake these same duties. President Obama’s recent Executive Order
on interrogations makes this point explicitly. It states the CIA needs to
either submit to the same monitoring as Department of Defense com-
ponents or, if that is not appropriate, create equivalent monitoring.300
Given this imperative, the armed forces’ experience with IHL
compliance provides some indication of what the CIA will need to im-
plement. Historically, the United States has under-prosecuted law of
war violations.301 More often, where U.S. personnel have seriously vio-
lated IHL, military and civilian prosecutors have been reluctant to
pursue the prosecution of these cases.302 Despite these relatively infre-
quent prosecutions, the United States has developed perhaps the
world’s most thorough and effective law of war compliance pro-
gram.303 This can be seen as part of the gradual “lawyering up” of the
military, i.e., the number of uniformed lawyers has steadily increased
from a few dozen to several thousand.304 This has both led and con-
tributed to a great deal of caution in U.S. military operations, to the
extent of uniformed lawyers sometimes playing a dominant role in
target selection and mission planning.305 Many scholars, especially
those who have been uniformed lawyers, laud not only the role in
military operations that individual lawyers have played, but also the
broader idea of a way of war-fighting that lawyers have largely
edge of suspected or alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions are obligated by regula-
tion to report such matters through command channels or to designated individuals, such
as the SJA [Staff Judge Advocate] or IG [Inspector General].”)
299. Id. app. at E § E-1.
300. Exec. Order No. 13,491, supra note 231, § 3(b).
301. See generally Maj. Jeffrey F. Addicott & Maj. William A. Hudson, Jr., The Twenty-Fifth
Anniversary of My Lai: A Time to Inculcate the Lessons, 139 MIL. L. REV. 153, 160–61 (1993)
(describing how Lt. Calley and others largely responsible for the My Lai massacre received
extremely light punishment, and recommending improved IHL training and increased
prosecution of law of war violations by U.S. service members).
302. See, e.g., id. at 160–61.
303. Dep’t of Defense Directive 2311.01E, Law of War Program, May 6, 2006, http://
www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101p.pdf [hereinafter DoD Directive
2311.01E].
304. Glenn Sulmasey & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A Rational
Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1835–47 (2007).
305. Nathan A. Canestaro, Legal and Policy Constraints on the Conduct of Aerial Precision
Warfare, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 431, 483 (2004) (“Military lawyers are embedded into
the targeting process to ensure every target may be legitimately attacked under the law of
armed conflict, while each military target is carefully identified and vetted for the risk of
collateral damage. . . . The respect demonstrated by U.S. forces for the law of war even
goes so far as to constitute a disadvantage when fighting rogue states who violate these
same laws to protect their combat forces.”).
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shaped.306 But even if one takes the role of lawyers in wartime to be an
unalloyed good, it is very difficult to dispute the role of military law-
yers and the thoroughness of law of war compliance that has gone
beyond what elected branches contemplated. A similar phenomenon
should play out in the CIA if it is brought under IHL.
As the number of lawyers and incentives for lawyerly behavior in-
crease, external controls on an agency or other component weaken.
The military has chafed under civilian control, including the legal ad-
vice of civilian lawyers,307 and, as a result, military lawyers have advo-
cated for more law of war compliance than the civilian authorities.308
Though the CIA will inevitably lawyer-up as it is required to be more
IHL compliant, the effectiveness of external control will decrease. The
CIA can be expected to comply with more parts of the law of war than
might be directly required by statute or regulation as relatively slight
or ineffective regulation has led to an unexpected amount of compli-
ance in the military and other regulated entities.309
Finally, the fear of prosecution among CIA agents310 is real and
has already had effects.311 As regulation increases, so will the fear, and
so will efforts to avoid litigation at any cost—notably, by complying
even more than the political branches intended, supplemented by an
increasingly independent-minded and conservative legal culture. The
decision of Attorney General Eric Holder to investigate the methods
of CIA interrogators, in a dramatic reversal of the Bush Administra-
tion recommendations,312 will inevitably increase these fears, and
hence their effect.
Thus, the CIA can be expected to substantially comply with the
law of war beyond what the Executive would force. This process is also
the most likely source for regulating paramilitary CIA operations, al-
306. See Michael A. Newton, Modern Military Necessity: The Role and Relevance of Military
Lawyers, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 877 (2007).
307. Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 304, 1835–47 (The Article argues, in part, that a rise in
the number of uniformed lawyers has led to increasing autonomy of the military from
civilian leadership. Military leadership often has different policy preferences from civilian
leadership and the rise in the number of uniformed lawyers has contributed to the military
leadership’s increasing ability to articulate, argue for, and even implement, these policy
preferences.).
308. Id.
309. See generally Vandenbergh, supra note 287, at 2053, 2077 (detailing “overcomp-
liance” with the law stemming from private law enforcement and monitoring mechanisms
that follow the implementation of major public law initiatives).
310. Shane, supra note 287.
311. Id.
312. See, e.g., David Johnston, Justice Report Advises Pursuit of Abuse Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 2009, at A1.
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though the effect of this process would not be limited to such
regulations.
B. Finding Legal Standards for Foreign Intelligence: Growing into
the Law of War
A combination of U.S. Supreme Court and executive action has
put intelligence interrogation under the law of war.313 Moreover, the
CIA, largely of its own accord, is likely to thoroughly implement, and
even expand, IHL standards applied to it. It is worth asking, then,
what form this implementation and expansion will take. Generally,
the CIA can be expected to abide by IHL when it would be inconsis-
tent or absurd not to, given other IHL commitments. And it will prob-
ably not abide by IHL—even if pressed to abide by some legal
standard—when other, non-IHL laws apply more naturally. In particu-
lar, there is a good chance the CIA will subject its paramilitary and
abduction/arrest operations to IHL, while not subjecting monitoring
and pure intelligence-gathering to the same standards, since these al-
ready operate under extensive domestic regulation and likely do not
violate international law.
Conclusion
Increasing legal regulation of intelligence activities has moved
the law toward an expanded demos protected by law—not executive
policy. In particular, these developments protect non-U.S. nationals
who are held outside of U.S. territory314 and do so in at least two im-
portant ways: first, by putting U.S. intelligence activities under the law
of war; and, second, by expanding the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.315
Such developments represent a fundamentally new way of structuring
intelligence law.316
Until the past few years, no substantial international law of intelli-
gence existed,317 while humanitarian law has treated intelligence op-
313. See supra Part III.
314. Colangelo, supra note 129, at 625.
315. See supra Part III.
316. See supra Part II (outlining the traditional way intelligence law has been struc-
tured); see also supra Part III (discussing the emerging structure of intelligence law).
317. The CIA developed during the end of a legal regime that had existed for hun-
dreds of years. By common consent, the modern law of war began with the Civil War’s
Lieber Code. See generally Richard D. Rosen, Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror:
Preserving Civilian Immunity, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 683, 695 (2009) (“The first real
effort to codify these constraints did not occur until the mid-nineteenth century during the
American Civil War. In 1863, a German-American jurist and political philosopher, Dr.
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erations either with outright hostility or with universally ineffective
attempts at regulation such as the Nicaragua case.318 Such interna-
tional regulations had no measurable impact on intelligence activity
and seem to have not penetrated intelligence agencies’ collective con-
sciousness.319 Thus, intelligence has operated in what some have re-
cently derided as a “law-free zone”320—due, implicitly, to either a
gross oversight on the part of lawmakers or a nefarious purpose on
the part of government leaders.
The U.S. government has undertaken secret, often illegal, intelli-
gence operations since the Revolutionary War.321 Presidents of all po-
litical parties, and in all eras, have ordered intelligence operations
either outside the law or in violation of the law.322 In the past, these
operations were justified, in almost romantic terms, by the “higher
purpose” of national survival. Such a sentiment seems archaic today,
but should not be easily dismissed. Even if the United States today
faces no existential threat on the order of the Soviet Union or Nazi
Germany, it has assigned its intelligence agencies a large part of the
doubtless important task of counter-terrorism, including enemy infil-
tration, information gathering, and occasional paramilitary attacks,
such as those that have recently taken place in Pakistan323 and those
that have been taking place in Afghanistan since 2001.324 Some of
Francis Lieber, prepared on behalf of President Abraham Lincoln a code governing the
conduct of Union forces. The Lieber Code established the basis for later international
conventions on the laws of war at Brussels in 1874 and at The Hague in 1899 and 1907.”
(footnote omitted)). Since that time, IHL has undergone almost continuous development,
most recently in areas such as the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions
and the application of IHL standards to precision aerial bombing. See id. Until the past few
years, these changes had little, if any, impact on intelligence operations, including the
paramilitary operations to which they should have applied. Id.
318. See supra Part II.B.
319. See supra Part II.C.
320. See, e.g., Press Release, Center for Constitutional Rights, CCR President Michael
Ratner Talks About Prosecution of Bush Officials on Democracy Now! (undated) (“How
did we get to a point where the United States government tried to make Guantanamo Bay
a law-free zone, in order to deny accountability for our actions?”).
321. ALLEN W. DULLES, THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE: AMERICA’S LEGENDARY SPY MASTER
ON THE FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING FOR A FREE WORLD 29–37 (Lyons Press
2006).
322. See id.
323. See Birsel, supra note 241; DeYoung & Warrick, supra note 241, at A10; Mazzetti &
Sanger, supra note 241, at A1; Perlez, supra note 241, at A10; Sanger & Schmitt, supra note
241, at A1; Schmitt & Drew, supra note 241, at A15; Shah, supra note 241; Shah & Cowell,
supra note 241, at A10; Solomon, Gorman & Rosenberg, supra note 241; Toosi, supra note
241.
324. See Greg Miller, CIA Expanding Presence in Afghanistan, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2009,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-intel20-2009sep20,0,606
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these operations plausibly violate international law. What is more, no
intelligence agency has conducted itself under law of war regulations.
As former Vice President Gore aptly observed, governments have tra-
ditionally assigned to intelligence agencies those tasks that, however
necessary, are also illegal. In fact, that is a large part of the reason why
one undertakes secret operations in the first place.325
This legal regime (or lack thereof), and the attitudes that sup-
ported it, now seem to be passing. U.S. intelligence agencies have
worked under significant regulation, designed to limit their domestic
power and activities, for decades. Now, for the first time, intelligence
agencies are operating under either the law of war,326 or human rights
law,327 or both. This process has wrought massive legal changes and,
by its own momentum, will result in more. These changes expand the
U.S. government’s conception of the demos and replace political re-
strictions with legal restrictions i.e., give rise to a concrete legal cosmo-
politanism.328 The question now becomes: Can the CIA still do its job
under these new restrictions? As the GWOT drags on, we will come to
know the answer, for good or ill.
1626,full.story (describing how the activities of U.S. intelligence agencies, and the CIA in
particular, spiked first in 2001 with around 150 Agency operatives in Afghanistan, 300 in
2005, and recently up to 700 operatives in the country).
325. CLARKE, supra note 1, at 144.
326. See supra Part III.B.
327. See supra Part I.B.1.
328. See supra Part I.A.
